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Abstract  
The central research question of this study concerns how corruption as a political risk 
factor should be measured in order to provide an accurate assessment of the risk factor 
within the oil and gas industry. The aim is to answer this question with the aid and support 
of two sub-questions that have been identified as crucial in pursuing this research. The 
first sub-question conceptualizes corruption as a political risk factor specifically within the 
oil and gas industry. The second sub-question addresses the oil and gas industry-specific 
indicators of corruption as a political risk factor. The research embarks upon seven 
industry-specific indicators, by isolating the relevant national political structural and 
institutional framework, which has proved essential in identifying the level of corruption as 
a risk to the oil and gas investor. The indicators are regarded as the most salient variables 
that can measure the level of corruption as a political risk in a realistic and practical 
approach. The indicators are subsequently systemised into a matrix that is constructed 
with the aim of using it as a general measurement tool for oil and gas investors. The study 
argues that this measurement tool can be of use to the oil and gas investor as it 
contributes to businesses recognition and anticipation of corruption. The matrix is 
furthermore applied to the oil and gas industry in Nigeria, in an attempt to test the matrix, 
and in order to establish how and to what level corruption constitutes as a political risk 
factor for the oil and gas industry in this country. The result of the indicators demonstrates 
that the political risk of encountering corruption for the oil and gas investor in Nigeria is of a 
high level. This study provides a valid basis of constituting how corruption manifests as a 
risk for the oil and gas investor. Furthermore, the applicability of the matrix provides a 
practical utility and constructive assessment. This thesis provides a firm foundation for 
future research in this field. 
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Opsomming  
Die sentrale navorsingsvraag van hierdie studie handel oor hoe korrupsie as n politieke 
risiko faktor gemeet moet word om n akkurate bepaling van die risiko faktor binne die 
oilie- en gas industrie te maak. Die doel is om hierdie vraag te beantwoord met die hulp 
van twee sub-navorsingsvrae wat geïdentifiseer is essensieël on hierdie navorsing the 
voltooi. Die eerste sub-navorsingvraag konseptualiseer korrupsie as n politieke risiko 
factor, spesifiek binne die olie en gas industrie. Die tweede sub-navorsingsvraag handel 
oor die industie-spesifieke indikatore van korrupsie as n politieke risiko faktor. Die 
navorsing is gevestig op sewe industrie-spesifieke indikatore, wat geïsoleer word vanaf 
relevante nasionale politieke strukture en institusionele raamwerke, wat essensieël is in 
die identifikasie van die vlak van korrupsie as n risiko vir die oilie en gas belegger. Die 
indikatore word beskou as die mees prominente veranderlikes wat die vlak van korrupsie 
as n politieke risiko kan meet, as n realistiese en praktiese benadering. Die indikatore 
word gevolglik geplaas binne n raamwerk wat gebou is met die doel om dit te bebruik as 
n algemene maatstaf vir die belegger in die oilie-en gas industrie. Hierdie studie 
argumenteer dat die maatstaf gebruik kan word in die olie-en gas industrie, siende dat dit 
bydrae tot besighede se erkenning en antisipasie van korrupsie. Die maatstaf word verder 
toegepas op die geval van die olie-en gasindustrie in Nigerië, met die doel om dit te toets 
en ook om vas te stel to watter vlak korrupsie as n politieke risiko faktor vir die olie-en gas 
industrie teenwoordig is in hierdie land. Die resultaat van die indikatore dui daarop dat 
daar n hoë vlak van politieke risiko vir die olie-en gas industrie in Nigerië bestaan. Die 
studie verskaf n geldige basis om vas te stel hoe korrupsie in die olie-en gas industrie 
manifesteer. Verder, die toepaslikheid van die maatstaf verskaf praktiese bruikbaarheid en 
konstruktiewe meeting. Die tesis verskaf n stewige basis vir toekomstige navrsing in die 
veld. 
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Chapter One: Introduction   
1.1 General Introduction 
Modern society and industry are virtually impossible to envisage without oil and gas, which 
are the essential foundation and drivers of the vibrancy of todays world economy. The oil 
and gas industry is in a position where it has to sustain equilibrium between domestic and 
international supply and demand. At the same time it has to maintain a level of profit that 
assures sustainability and continued existence in the market (Boshoff, 2009). As oil and 
gas are ultimately finite resources, investors continuously seek opportunities in regions 
and areas where oil and gas have been identified.   
Private foreign investment in oil and gas1 dates back to the beginning of the 20th 
century, where the host governments in the Middle East granted foreign companies 
concessions, providing them with the exclusive rights to exploit the natural resources of a 
specified area (Lax, 1983: 21). The internationalisation process of the oil and gas industry 
started escalating in the 1930-40s and an increasing number of private actors have 
entered the scene throughout the past century, contributing to a growing competition of 
access to oil and gas. On par with the globalisation trend of the past century, there has 
been an increasing flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) worldwide, with the oil and gas 
industry as one of the dominant ventures in this respect. Today, multinational corporations 
around the world compete in capturing an early market share in the oil and gas sector, as 
the gap between supply and demand is getting narrower.   
At the same time that internationalisation and investments in the world have 
increased, multinational enterprises have, as a consequence, become exposed to a 
number of risks of various kinds, one of them being political risk. Political risk implicates 
the possibility of negative effects for a company due to political actions or inactions2 (Brink, 
2004: 18). Investment in foreign territories can present several factors of risk that may 
result in not receiving expected returns, making fewer gains on the investment, or losing 
the investment entirely (Brink, 2004: 1). Berlin et al. (2003: 1) define risk as a constantly 
present factor in business decision-making process, and determining appropriate ways to 
manage and mitigate risks is crucial to the ultimate success of any new investment or 
expansion of already existing business operations . For instance, the legal relationship 
                                                 
1 The focus on natural gas was traditionally low-key, until it started to assume international political 
proportions from the early 1980s (Lax, 1983: 6) 
2 Chapter Two will treat the conceptualisation of Political risk and related concepts 
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between oil and gas companies and host governments has changed considerably since 
the original concessions were granted. Over time, bargaining power and project 
agreements have increasingly favoured the host states and foreign firms have steadily 
experienced a diminution of agency in their operations abroad (Lax, 1983: 25). As a result, 
a number of political risks have emerged from a variety of sources, such as expropriation, 
currency controls, and requirements for additional local production. The oil and gas 
companies operating on foreign land are vulnerable to foreign governments decisions as 
they can affect the production or operation. In addition, there are an increasing number of 
factors that have caused financial, personnel or operative losses to the oil and gas 
industry. Investments often take place in destination countries that are unstable, 
unpredictable, complex or hostile.   
Political risk analysis has therefore increased in importance and is now of great value 
to the oil and gas industry to help understand and evaluate the environment that the 
company will work in. Political risk analysis assists in the investment process that often 
requires large sunk costs upfront, staff to relocate to project site, reliance on local 
infrastructure and institutional safeguards and inputs (material and labour). By not 
including political risk analysis, all these mentioned risks will remain unknown to the 
investor.   
Many of the political risks faced by the oil and gas sector originate from the 
relationship between the oil and gas companies and the host government. The conduct 
and arrangements are often different in foreign countries and the practices are dissimilar to 
their familiar business etiquette at home. Corruption is one such phenomenon that may be 
part of the accepted business environment in some countries, whilst not in others.  
Although corruption is not a new phenomenon, it has recently entered the stage of interest 
in political risk assessment and is acknowledged as hazardous for the oil and gas 
company s profit. Corruption is firstly a market failure, which implies an irregularity in the 
free market logic that can harm or hamper profit. Involvement in corrupt practises also 
counters corporate social responsibility (CSR), which may destroy the reputation of 
companies, and, furthermore, have judicial and financial consequences. The growing 
focus on corruption and corporate social responsibility in foreign territories has been 
translated as a political risk factor for oil and gas companies investing abroad. Many oil 
and gas ventures have (or are currently) operating in countries where various forms of 
corruption are inherent in the state s modus operandi, making the oil and gas companies 
particularly exposed to the risk of encountering corruption. The media and a number of 
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Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have contributed to enhance the focus on 
corruption both on the domestic and international scale (Global Compact, 2008: 13). In 
turn, several governments and international institutions, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN) and United States (US) stock market have 
responded with the implementation of laws and regulations, as mechanisms to mitigate 
different companies involvement in corruption3, including in the oil and gas sector.   
Although the various measures and efforts to counter corruption are evolving in the 
oil and gas industry, where some of them have been mentioned in previous paragraphs, 
certain scandals demonstrate that corruption still occurs.  An example is Norwegian Statoil 
that had to pay a fine of $21 million after admitting to having paid bribes to Iranian officials 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 2006). Other oil and gas companies, such as Total and British 
Petroleum (BP), have also been investigated and convicted for involvement in corruption 
(Dagens Næringsliv, 2006). As such, corruption stipulates a political risk to the investor in 
the oil and gas industry. However, corruption as a political risk factor has been a complex 
factor to determine in an overall risk analysis, as it manifests itself in many forms of 
varying degrees of severity. The major reason for this is that there is a lack of consistency 
in defining corruption as a political risk factor and a disparate understanding of the 
threshold of acceptance for corruption. In order to mitigate and manage corruption as a 
political risk factor, prior to and during the investment process, corruption in the oil and gas 
industry needs a definition with specific and measurable indicators. This study will provide 
an extensive investigation on how corruption constitutes a political risk factor in the oil and 
gas industry and determine how it can be measured as part of a political risk analysis.   
The next section of this chapter will provide an overview of the literature that is used 
as a foundation for the thesis. The third section presents the research question, which will 
be the anchor point throughout the study. Section four addresses the rationale and 
objectives of the research study, while the fifth section will establish the research design 
and the methodology that will be applied to the study. The sixth section addresses the 
delimitations and limitations of the research, and section seven presents a readers guide. 
The final section of this chapter provides the conclusion.  
1.2 Literature Review 
The literature and data utilised in this research have been divided into four major themes; 
1. Political risk analysis and the theory behind it, 2. Political risk in the oil and gas industry, 
                                                 
3 Chapter three will treat corruption as a political risk factor and discuss the control mechanisms of corruption 
that affects businesses.  
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3. Corruption and causes of corruption in the oil and gas industry, 4. Corruption and 
causes of corruption in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The first and second themes are 
included in Chapter Two, the third theme forms the foundation of Chapter Three, and the 
fourth is covered in Chapter Four.   
The first theme concerns the literature on conceptualisation of political risk analysis 
and theory that relates to political risk analysis as well as some theory of decision-making 
and rational choice. The theoretical framework in the first theme is provided with the aid of 
Brink s 2004 book, Measuring Political Risk: Risks to foreign investment. Furthermore, 
articles by Robock (1971), Kobrin (1978,1979), Kaplan and Garrick (1980), Fitzpatrick 
(1983), Simon (1982), Lindeberg and Morndal (2002), Jensen (2005), Alon et al. (2006), 
Hough et al. (2008) and Bremmer (2009) will be used for their theoretical and conceptual 
contribution to the field of political risk analysis.   
The second theme focuses on political risk in the oil and gas industry, which will also 
be treated in Chapter Two. The literature covered on this area includes ¨Political risk in the 
oil and gas industry¨ by Lax (1983), Bremmers ¨The Fat Tail¨ (2009), articles from Berlin et 
al. (2003) and Alon et al. (2006). These books and articles help to provide the link between 
the oil and gas industry and political risk analysis. Furthermore, they give an insight into 
the decision-making (risk-assessment) and risk management (risk-mitigation) aspects of 
political risk. Furthermore, articles by Knott (1997), Venter (1997), Alon and Martin (1998), 
Hallmark and Whited (2001), Boulos (2002), Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) and 
Control Risks (2009) will be used for their contribution to the field of political risk and the 
analysis thereof.   
The third theme revolves around corruption and political causes of corruption, and 
includes literature that regards the phenomenon, and, furthermore, the legal aspects of 
corruption in business relations. The literature used includes articles from Control Risks 
(2009), Wolkers and Hakobyan (2004), Shkolnikov (2002), Neelankavil (2003), Al-Kasim, 
Søreide and Williams (2008), Webster (2002), Elliott (1997), Oslo Governance Centre 
(OGC, 2008), Klitgaard (1991), Brink (2004), Alt and Lassen (2008), Azfar and Nelson 
(2007), Goudie and Stasavage (1998), Tanzi (1998), Kennedy and Di Tella (2001), 
Schedler (1999), Webster (2002), Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000), Uslaner (2007), 
Transparency International Norway (2009), TI (2011), Global Corruption Barometer (2010) 
and Global Integrity (2011).    
The fourth theme, covered in Chapter Four, is applied theory. A matrix of corruption 
as a political risk will be used to assess the case of oil and gas investment in Nigeria. The 
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literature used for the fourth theme deals with an overview of the political structure and 
national framework in Nigeria, as well as the background of the oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria. The main articles and reports that will be used are from Amadi, Germiso and 
Henriksen (2006), Amundsen (2010), Gillies (2009), Bertelsmann Stifung (BTI) (2010), 
Oraegbunam (2005), Republic report (2011), Control Risks (2009), Freedom Info (2011), 
Global Integrity report: Nigeria (2008), US Department of State (2010) as well as 
Transparency International (TI) (2009 and 2011).   
1.3 Research Problem 
Due to oil and gas companies increased activity in foreign countries, businesses have 
devoted a larger interest in political risk analysis. In order to evaluate the risk of losing 
potential profit of an investment and operation, it is of vital importance to conduct a 
complete political risk analysis. Risk analysis involves the entire process from identifying 
the risks and assessing them to actually responding to the various risks in one way or 
another (Lindeberg and Morndal, 2002: 2). In this study the focus will be on corruption as 
one political risk factor in the oil and gas industry. In this regard, corruption will be 
conceptualised, identified and assessed. From the discussion in this chapter, the research 
question is as follows:   
How should corruption as a political risk factor be measured in order to provide an 
accurate assessment of the risk within the oil and gas industry?   
To be able to answer this question, two sub-questions have been identified to supplement 
and support the main research question. They are as follows:  
How can corruption as a political risk factor within the oil and gas industry be 
adequately conceptualised? What are the indicators of corruption as a political risk factor 
in the oil and gas industry? 
1.4 Rationale and Objectives of the Research Study 
Many oil and gas companies have developed matrices that estimate how their profitability 
might be impacted under varying financial scenarios (PWC, 2006). However, many 
businesses have come to realise that the political landscape also has an immense impact 
on how markets operate. The political environment ultimately constructs the framework for 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
6
the economy as well as the stated policies, and changes in the regulatory political scene 
can severely affect the investment. Political risk analysis has therefore become 
considerably important for businesses investing and operating abroad, by the means of 
identifying, measuring and monitoring the political situation in order to help protect the 
companies from preventable losses.   
Corruption is one of the factors that characterise the political environment in many of 
the resource-abundant countries, such as Nigeria, Iraq and Azerbaijan, and will 
consequently affect the investor in one way or the other (TI, 2009). It is thus of crucial 
interest to businesses to understand and evaluate the potential risk of corruption that can 
harm or hamper operations and economic returns. As Brink (2004: 3) argues, one way of 
solving the problem of not knowing what is out there , is by knowing what is . Political risk 
analysis can observe and measure threats such as corruption, which contribute to the 
recognition and anticipation of such future occurrences for businesses.   
Corruption as a political risk factor has become more important in the past decade. 
This is partially due to the growing number of domestic and international laws and 
regulations to control corporate behaviour and because of the severe consequences of 
being involved in corrupt activities. However, as already mentioned, there is a general lack 
of consistency in defining corruption as a political risk factor, as the activities that 
constitute illegal corruption differ, depending on the country or jurisdiction. There is also a 
complexity to find comparative and rigorous means of incorporating the range of outcomes 
that might arise from corruption, related to oil and gas companies in their international 
business activities. For instance, certain political funding practices that are legal in one 
place may be illegal in another. Reports by the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) have identified some questionable 
strategies employed by oil companies in Nigeria; examples of these are paying off village 
chiefs or government officials for drilling rights (Nairne, 2007: 9). In some cases, 
government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, which make it difficult to 
distinguish between legal and illegal actions. For instance, bribery of government officials 
is illegal and is considered shameful in nearly every society. In other cases, however, the 
perspectives are very different. Many legal activities may be unethical, and some ethical 
activities may be illegal (Kennedy and Di Tella, 2001: 1).   
Corruption manifests itself in many forms of varying degrees of severity, which 
creates a blurred distinction of what is tolerable and what is not. With an accurate 
understanding of where and how corruption as a risk arises in the oil and gas industry, 
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management can drive higher quality returns to the bottom line (PWC, 2006: 1). It is 
therefore of crucial importance, and is in the interest for oil and gas companies, to have a 
stipulated concept of corruption.  
In addition to numerous international conventions and organisations that contribute 
to the prevention of corruption, oil and gas companies must also submit to the provisions 
of law, either by their home country or to stock market regulations.  However, despite 
current policies, management systems and control, businesses still encounter corruption in 
certain host countries, an issue that cannot be neglected in decision-making. According to 
Brink (2004: 95), corruption implies that a transaction takes place between a corruptor 
and corruptee . However, there are still ambiguities as to what transactions this applies to 
and what defines a corruptor and corruptee. In order to establish how corruption poses a 
threat to investors, the supply and demand side of corruption needs to be scrutinised. 
Subsequently, the first objective of this research is to investigate how corruption 
constitutes a political risk factor for investors in the oil and gas industry. Based on such 
analysis, the objective is to create a refined and methodical matrix that can be added to a 
complete political risk analysis for an oil and gas company to use as a contribution to its 
overall risk profile. The matrix can also be used on its own as a tool to measure the risk of 
corruption in an oil and gas investment. This will provide useful knowledge of corruption for 
decision makers in the oil and gas industry.  
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
The goal of this research is to assess what constitutes corruption as a political risk factor 
for investment in the oil and gas industry, and further, to develop a tool for measuring 
corruption as part of a political risk analysis. The point of departure is to design a viable 
strategy of conducting the research according to the nature of the research question and 
the sub-questions. This is called the research design, which is a blueprint of how the 
research should be conducted (Babbie and Mouton, 2006: 72-79). In order to arrive at the 
result of the research, the methodology shall provide an action plan for collecting, 
organising and integrating data for the research. The unit of analysis is corruption in the oil 
and gas industry.   
Corruption can be studied in multiple ways; however, for the purpose of this 
research, where corruption is treated as a political risk factor, the research methodology 
will be of an empirical nature based on mainly qualitative research. Corruption is a social 
phenomenon with a subjective nature. There are examples of quantitative studies of 
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corruption, but as they are normally limited to a small aspect of corruption, this study will 
only include their conclusions as a contribution to the qualitative data.  
A main advantage of the qualitative method is, according to Holme and Solvang (1991), its 
ability to show a totality of various variables and therefore give increased understanding of 
contexts and relations. The choice of the qualitative method corresponds well to the 
research problem, which requires an understanding of how a large amount of variables 
interrelate. Also, because corruption is ultimately a social phenomenon, it is best 
scrutinised by qualitative methods.   
Unlike quantitative analysis, there are no clearly agreed rules or procedures for 
analysing qualitative data (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003: 201). However, for the purpose of 
studying corruption as a political risk factor, a grounded theory is the most suitable 
approach. Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 201) suggest that grounded theory involves the 
generation of analytical categories and their dimensions, and the identification of 
relationships between them . This research will thus be designed to systematically identify, 
develop and relate the concepts that constitute the building blocks of the theory. In other 
words, this qualitative study will bear similarities to the inductive approach, which implies 
that generalisations, concepts and hypotheses arise from the information obtained in a 
study and that theory will be built from data that is collected throughout the study (Merriam, 
1988).   
The research is micro in its scope as the focus is solely on the oil and gas industry 
and corruption as the single political risk factor. The research design firstly includes a 
discourse analysis of what constitutes corruption as a political risk factor. Discourse 
analysis in this case implies an analysis of the primary and secondary literature in order to 
identify relevant elements that can be used to operationalise corruption as a political risk 
factor.   
For the purpose of measuring corruption in a political risk analysis in the oil and gas 
industry, a matrix will be constructed, with low-, medium- and high-risk measurements. 
Babbie and Mouton (2007: 643) define a matrix as A type of composite measure that 
summarises several specific observations and represents some more general dimension . 
With regards to the general matrix of corruption in political risk analysis, it will be 
developed to measure levels of severity for the risk of investment. Reports based on 
interviews with numerous groups that have dealt with some form of corruption, including oil 
employees, government officials and researchers, will be used to construct indicators of 
corruption as a political risk factor. Subsequently the matrix will be applied to a case study 
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of oil and gas investment in Nigeria and be used to measure the level of corruption as a 
political risk that is present for the investor.   
The purpose of the study will thus be both descriptive and have a practical 
orientation. Moreover, it will include applied research. The descriptive part will be formed 
by the discussion of what corruption is and how it occurs. This will assist the development 
of the matrix, which has a practical purpose. The qualitative data analysis of the 
information from the secondary literature will be structured into this matrix. Furthermore, 
the practical part includes the application of the matrix on a case study of corruption as a 
political risk factor in Nigeria.   
For practical reasons, and for the limitations that arises when doing research on 
corruption, the data collection has been limited to the method of using predominantly 
secondary literature. The study will thus mainly rely on secondary data, sourcing 
information from academic books, journals and articles available on the Internet.   
For the investigation, there are no pre-determined numbers of parameters to 
conceptualise corruption, but rather an attempt to take in and evaluate all the variables 
that are detected to affect corruption as a political risk factor in the oil and gas industry. 
The research incorporates a case study with the intent to apply the data to a real 
investment situation in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. Yin (1994) defines a case study 
as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon with its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident . In this thesis the purpose of a case study is not to obtain information about the 
problem area as described by Yin, but to apply the data to a specific case, which is 
investment in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. Nigeria has been selected for this research 
as an investment country in oil and gas for two reasons; firstly because of the countrys 
abundance of oil and gas resources, and secondly due to the strongly rooted history of 
corruption (Nairne, 2007: 4). Successive military regimes have subjugated the rule of law 
and facilitated the wanton looting of public funds as well as decapitated public institutions 
(Nairne, 2007: 4). Consequently, oil and gas companies in Nigeria have encountered a 
political system in which corruption is inherent.  
1.6 Limitations and Delimitations 
The research will be delimited to only one political risk factor, corruption, and specified to 
investment in the oil and gas industry. The research on corruption will further be delimited 
in its historical span in the sense that the current situation will be regarded in the 
construction of the matrix. This is because the laws and regulations that have emerged in 
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the past decades must be taken into account. The data compiled will only be up until July 
2011. Any relevant events or information that may occur after that will not be taken into 
account.   
The research treats corruption, which can be perceived as a sensitive topic, from 
several perspectives. It is therefore expected that a few obstacles and difficulties will arise 
throughout the research, and a number of limitations have been acknowledged. First of all, 
the research will not have access to already existing risk models that are either used by in-
house analysts or established risk companies current risk models, as they are considered 
intellectual property rights of those companies who have developed them. This will not 
necessarily be an obstacle to the research, as the purpose is to construct a new and 
general matrix of corruption as a political risk factor in the oil and gas industry. The 
information used will be gathered from general and academic sources. Other classified or 
confidential information that regards a company s involvement in corruption will not be 
included.   
There is limited primary data to convey the study and no financial resources are 
provided to conduct this study, which will not make it possible in this case to do field 
research. More primary data would have further enhanced the study. However, this 
obstacle will be overcome by using up to-date information and descriptive literature of 
both corruption in the oil and gas industry and corruption in Nigeria. The literature obtained 
is sufficient in forming a reliable and representative foundation for the purpose of 
measuring corruption as a political risk in the oil and gas industry.  
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Chapter Four 
-Case study of 
Nigeria 
- Demonstration of 
matrix   
1.7 Readers guide 
Chapter Two is dedicated to the conceptualisation of 
key terms related to political risk analysis and the 
theoretical framework that forms the basis of this 
research. The theoretical framework will help the reader 
to understand the principles and function of political risk 
analysis as well as the numerous aspects involved in 
the discipline. Furthermore, this chapter will 
contextualise political risk in the oil and gas industry.  
Chapter Three will firstly discuss the growing focus on 
corruption in the business world and then conceptualise 
corruption as a political risk factor. Based upon generic 
indicators of corruption as a political risk for businesses, 
an matrix of corruption as a political risk factor in the oil 
and gas industry will be constructed in order to measure 
the risk factor for an investor.  
Chapter Four will apply the matrix of corruption as a 
political risk factor to a case study of Nigeria. Nigeria 
has a high record of corruption present in society as 
well as an established presence of oil and gas 
companies. The matrix constructed in Chapter Three 
will be used to demonstrate its function in the case of 
investment in the oil and gas sector in Nigeria.   
Chapter Five will conclude and reflect upon the 
accomplishments and failures of this research. It will 
comment on possible improvements. Furthermore, it will 
look at avenues for future research.  
Chapter Two 
-Theoretical 
framework 
- Political risk in 
the oil and gas 
industry  
Chapter 5  
- Conclusion 
Chapter Three 
-Conceptualise 
corruption as 
political risk factor 
-Matrix of 
corruption as 
political risk factor 
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1.8 Conclusion   
This chapter has provided a general introduction to the research problem, as well as a 
technical outline of the research design and methodology, its limitations and delimitations, 
and a readers guide to the remaining chapters. The central research problem in this study 
is to conceptualise corruption in order to find means to measure corruption as a political 
risk factor in the oil and gas industry. The aim of this research is therefore to construct an 
matrix of indicators that can measure the level of corruption as a political risk factor in the 
oil and gas industry. Two sub-questions have been identified to supplement and support 
the research problem. The sub-questions include conceptualising corruption as a political 
risk factor by describing the indicators, which are the measurement tools of determining 
the level of risk. Furthermore, the matrix will be applied to a practical case of investment in 
oil and gas in Nigeria.   
The following chapter will provide the theoretical framework for the discipline of 
political risk analysis and decision-making theory. It will point out certain key aspects and 
distinctions of political risk analysis. Furthermore, the chapter will contextualise political 
risk in the oil and gas industry.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Contextualization of 
Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry  
2.1 Introduction 
Multinational enterprises that seek opportunities in new regions and markets are usually 
faced with a number of unknown realities. Consequently, there is a need for businesses to 
identify, examine and explain the unknown circumstances, which often can be translated 
into various risks. The field of risk analysis has therefore become vital to the investor, as it 
has an important impact upon the evaluation of the profitability of an investment. Risk 
analysis includes both country risk and political risk, which in practice are two different 
fields. Although the distinction will be touched upon in this chapter, the purpose of this 
research is to focus on political risk and the analysis thereof, and not country risk.   
For many of the decisions that modern businesses must take, sophisticated and 
specialised techniques such as large-scale econometric models are frequently utilised. 
Although judgment also plays a role in the decision process, it is buttressed by product, 
market, and advertising studies (Kobrin, 2001: 113). Throughout the past decades, 
businesses have also opened their eyes to the impact that the political environment has on 
the business and the expected returns. The importance of identifying, analysing and 
managing socio-political and governmental situations has thus developed as a discipline 
called political risk analysis.   
This chapter has a dual aim; firstly to provide a theoretical framework and 
conceptualise relevant terminology of political risk analysis, and secondly, to contextualise 
political risk in the oil and gas industry. In order to illustrate the ground principles on how 
businesses make choices, the first section will start with a theoretical description of 
problem solving theory and rational choice theory. The chapter will further discuss key 
political risk concepts and aspects, which helps to provide a clearly defined point of 
departure of political risk analysis in the oil and gas industry. In this regard it is important to 
gain conceptual clarity of what political risk includes (and excludes) and the analysis 
thereof. This will be treated in the first part of this chapter, whilst the second part will 
explain the large composition of the oil and gas sector, as well as contextualise political 
risk in the oil and gas industry.  
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2.2 Rational Choice and Problem Solving Theory 
Rational choice theory, also known as rational action theory, is one of the dominant 
theoretical approaches to understanding human behaviour, actions and choices. The 
theoretical framework has long been the central paradigm in economics, but in recent 
decades it has become more widely used in other disciplines, such as Sociology, Political 
Science and Anthropology (Green, 2002: 2). In colloquial language, rationality refers to 
sane or in a thoughtful clear headed manner. In Rational Choice Theory, rationality
simply means that a person acts upon balancing costs against benefits in order to arrive at 
a result that maximises advantage. Rational Choice Theory generally begins with 
consideration of the choice behaviour of one or more individual decision-making units 
which in basic economics are most often consumers and/or firms (Green, 2002: 2). An 
agent s choices reflect the most preferred feasible alternative implied by preferences that 
are complete and transitive (Green, 2002: 46).  
Although rational choice theory is conceived as a normative model of an idealised 
decision maker, and not a description of the behaviour of real people, it helps to 
understand and forecast why certain choices are taken. Rational choice is therefore rather 
a logical analysis than a psychological analysis of risk and value (Tversky and Khaneman, 
1986: 251). The standard arguments for using this normative analysis to forecast and 
explain actual behaviour, is first of all, that people are generally thought to be effective in 
pursuing their goals, especially when they have incentives and opportunities.  Rational 
choice can therefore be described as a maximisation process. Furthermore, competition 
favours rational individuals and organisations. Optimal decisions increase the chances of 
survival in a competitive environment, and a minority of rational individuals can sometimes 
impose rationality on the whole market (Tversky and Khaneman, 1986: 251). Risk analysis 
adds value to the maximisation process by outlining the potential costs versus benefits. If 
an investor is uncertain of the best option to invest, political risk analysis contributes to 
manage such uncertainty. Brink (2004: 30) states that A political risk analysis, once 
conducted, draws the decision maker s attention to the various problems that political risks 
might pose to the profitability of the investment . Political risk analysis, in its attempt to 
manage uncertainties for the investor, can be seen as a rational attempt at problem 
solving (Brink, 2004: 30). According to Bunge (1998: in Brink, 2004: 30), Rational agents 
behave as risk-adverse persons intent on minimising uncertainty with the help of expert 
knowledge . The theory of rational choice is referred to in Chapter Three, which discusses 
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situations where corruption may occur in balancing benefits of engaging in corruption 
versus the potential costs of exposure.   
In all businesses, management and leadership continuously need to make 
decisions according to what tasks, choices or problems they are confronted with. Closely 
related to rational choice theory, is problem solving theory and decision-making theory, 
which refers to evaluating and making a choice. The general theory of problem solving 
focuses upon how humans respond to unfamiliar tasks and how the decisions are made. 
Major parts of running a business revolve around problem solving, such as choosing 
issues that require attention, setting goals, finding or designing suitable courses of action, 
as well as evaluating and choosing among alternative actions. The practical process of 
problem solving involves fixing agendas, setting goals, and designing actions (Simon, 
1986: 11).   
Both problem solving and decision-making require that the management must make 
a critical decision as to which of several strategies will be followed. Decisions can be 
strategic, often affecting the long-term direction of the entire company. In scores of lesser 
decisions, they can be tactical, which focus on more intermediate-term issues, or 
operational, referring to day-to-day activities within the company. However, all decisions 
are important to the organisations well being (Simon, 1986).  
Decision making typically follows a six-step process: identify the problem or 
opportunity; gather relevant information; develop as many alternatives as possible; 
evaluate alternatives to decide which is best; decide on and implement the best 
alternative; and follow-up on the decision (Simon, 1986). In order to identify, assess and 
manage the situation, political risk analysis evaluates both the external environment and 
the internal position of the business in relation to the environment. As Beroggi (1999: in 
Brink, 2004: 30) states, the words problem and solving denote, political risk analysis is 
concerned with situations in which one or more choices must be made, often under 
conditions of uncertainty and risk .  A political risk analysis, once conducted, draws the 
attention to the political risks that can affect the profitability of the investment. As such, it 
becomes clear that solving the problem of where to invest or expand operations
requires observations in order to find potential solutions. Investments in countries that 
have high levels of corruption requires both problem solving and the decision-making 
amongst the people involved in the process. Political risk analysis assists in coming to a 
solution and helps to rationalise the choice.  
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2.3 Conceptualizing Key Political Risk Terms  
From the theoretical grounding of which political risk is based, this section will examine key 
concepts that are related to political risk analysis, in order to achieve a thorough and 
higher level understanding of the discipline. As will become clear, there are difficulties 
associated with defining political risk and there exist various definitions in different 
literature. A number of conceptualizations from different authors will therefore be 
examined, before arriving at a definition that will be used for the remainder of the study.   
In order to arrive at a functional conceptualization of political risk, it is first 
necessary to clearly establish what is meant by risk, and secondly, what is meant by risk in 
a political context. The first sub-section treats the concept of risk and the second sub-
section will give a conceptual clarification of political risk, which can be distinguished from 
political instability. The third sub-section treats the difference between the notion of 
political risk and political instability. The fourth sub-section distinguishes political risk from 
country risk, which are two different forms of analysis. However, it will become clear that 
there is an intricate relationship between these two concepts. Furthermore, some attention 
will be given to the difference between quantitative and qualitative analysis in political risk 
in sub-section five, where the methodological problems encountered in political risk 
analysis will also be discussed. In the sixth sub-section, forecasting and predicting political 
risk are briefly discussed, and the seventh sub-section examines the difference between 
micro and macro risk. This research is concerned with industry-specific political risk, and 
the third section is dedicated to discussing general political risk in the oil and gas industry, 
before the last section, which will contextualise corruption in the oil and gas industry.  
2.3.1 Risk  
In a broad sense, risk refers to a potential or possibility of danger, harm, loss or adverse 
consequences occurring towards something or someone (Thompson, 1995: 7). Words that 
are commonly associated with risk include: vulnerability, danger, misfortune, adversary, 
hazard, peril, loss, threat, and these words are commonly used in reference to uncertain 
situations (Boshoff, 2009). However, it must be noted that in cases of uncertainty and risk, 
the outcome can be both positive and negative. Risk and uncertainty are both abstract 
concepts that are difficult to measure with precision (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 19). 
Both risk and uncertainty exemplify situations where the outcome may deviate from the 
estimate or forecast value (Raftery, 1994). Although the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty is difficult to ascertain and may seem academic, there is a crucial conceptual 
difference. Lindeberg and Mørndal (2002: 19) provide the following distinction, A decision 
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is called risky when the probability that an event will occur in the future is precisely known, 
for example in a fair roulette game. In contrast, a decision is called uncertain when the 
probability is not precisely known . Both terms refer to future likelihoods, but risk implies 
the ability to calculate probabilities and therefore to protect against and manage future 
contingencies, whilst uncertainty does not (Lax, 1983: 8). Unlike uncertainty, which deals 
with a subjective potentiality of a loss, risks are measurable probabilities (Lax, 1983:8).   
Kaplan and Garrick (1980: 12) explain risk as involving both uncertainty and some 
kind of loss or damage that might be received . Symbolically this could be expressed as 
Risk = Uncertainty + loss/damage (Lindeberg and Mørndal 2002: 20). By itself, risk 
concerns the deviation of a result of a future event from the expected value. Risk is a 
dynamic concept that revolves around the probability of changes. Current conditions are 
not risks; rather, risk stems from changes in those conditions and future occurrences may 
change the rules (Lax, 1983: 8).   
In line with this, Brink (2004: 3) argues that it is better to know what the risks are in 
order to manage the risks, instead of not knowing or being uncertain. The main task and 
challenge of risk management is to transform uncertainty into probabilistic, measurable 
assessments, or risks (Bremmer, 2009:17). Brink further states that when threats are 
recognized, they can be observed and measured. Thereby, one can plan ahead of them 
occurring and anticipate or manage the threats (Brink 2004: 3). In this study, the concept 
of risk is central in assessing how corruption translates as a political risk factor for 
investors.  
2.3.2 Political Risk  
Political risk can be seen as a related concept to risk, being the analytical process that 
uses particular variables to forecast the probability of events that may or may not affect an 
investment (Boshoff, 2009: 16). In other words, political risk can help assess how the 
business can be impacted under varying political scenarios. As multinational businesses 
operate in a particular political environment, the phenomenon of risk must be assessed in 
a political context. Political risk is a type of risk that investors, multinationals, foreign-based 
organizations and governments face as a result of a political-related situation, an 
unforeseen occurrence or environmental incident. Political risk can be regarded as any 
political change that alters the expected outcome and value of a given economic action by 
changing the probability of achieving business objectives (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
2006).  
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In the literature there have been several attempts to define political risk and provide 
a description of what factors political risk includes. The definitions of political risk range 
widely between the general and the specific; however, a conceptual framework has not yet 
been agreed upon (Fitzpatrick, 1983: 249). According to Fitzpatrick (1989: 249), The 
evolution of a body of knowledge concerned with the definition and assessment of political 
risk has been uncoordinated, due to the absence of a consensus regarding the conceptual 
framework on which to develop . The reason lies in that political risk is an interdisciplinary 
field that incorporates political, social, economic and environmental elements. Political risk 
analysis derives from social sciences and the nature of social science contains a degree of 
subjectivity. Brink (2004: 18) stresses that political risk is a nominal definition as many 
social scientific concepts. The reason for discrepancies in political risk has exactly to do 
with the nature of nominal definitions (Brink, 2004: 18). Some definitions are rather narrow, 
whilst others conceptualise political risk analysis in very broad terms. The Institute of Risk 
Management (IRM) provides an example of a traditional narrow definition by AON 
Corporation. It states that Political risks arise from the unforeseen actions or inactions of a 
foreign or third country. These risks can frustrate the payment and profitability of all types 
of contract and investment. They can also affect the safe repayment of facilities and loans 
to financing banks and lenders (IRM, 2004). The risk company, Control Risk Groups, 
presents a broader definition. It defines political risk as Political risks, as defined as all 
non-commercial risks, are inherent and often hidden in a country s political, business and 
cultural environment. They can have financial, operational, security and reputational 
impacts (IRM, 2004).  
As has been demonstrated, there are multiple definitions of political risk, but a 
common denominator is the manifestation of doubt regarding the frequency and 
consequences of undesirable events (Brink, 2004:17). For the purpose of this study, 
Simon s (1982) definition will be used, which refers to political risk as the governmental 
and societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the host country, and 
negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of foreign business operations 
and investments. (Simon, 1982: 68)  
Simon s (1982) definition of political risk is used because it includes political risks 
emanating from the host-country environment, home-country environment, international 
environment, and the global environment. Furthermore, it views political risk in the general 
environment context, whilst differentiating between internal and external causes of political 
risk, and includes both the country factors as well as the industry-specific concerns. This 
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study will expand Simons conceptualization by including an economic aspect to the 
political risk analysis outlined by Alon (1996). The reason to include an economic 
dimension to political risk is firstly because the economic climate is an important source of 
political risk. Secondly, politics and economic risks are often inseparable at the 
experimental level, and thirdly, it provides a more holistic and accurate notion of political 
risk (Alon and Martin, 1998: 365 in Alon et al., 2006: 625).   
Political risk involves assessing whether an irregular political event will occur, and if 
so, whether it is likely to affect the existing or the potential business (Kobrin, 1978: 114). 
Examples of political risk include government rule, shifts in power, terror, insurrection, war 
and civil conflict, health and environmental situation, infrastructure, business trends, 
corruption and environmental changes, to name a few. The impact of a political occurrence 
may have adverse affects for an international business. Venezuelan president, Hugo 
Chavez, illustrates this when his government in early 2007 announced that it had plans to 
re-nationalize CANTV, one of the first telephone service enterprises in the country. 
CANTV s shares plunged as investors sold their shares.   
On the other hand, a political change can also improve the business climate, such 
as when the Chinese opened for economic reform and foreign trade, initiated after 1978, 
the country began to generate significant and steady growth in investment. Political risk 
analysis can therefore contribute to identify and capitalise on unexploited opportunities 
(PWC, 2006).   
It is important to note that the political environment can change on a daily basis. 
Although a country appears to have a politically stable environment, the potential is always 
there that this may change. For those analyzing political risk it is important to maintain the 
analysis on a regular basis as the political environment is dynamic and continuous in 
nature. The presence of corruption in a country, which is the focus of this research, is not 
likely to change on a daily basis; however, as a political risk, it will also need a continuous 
assessment, as new rules or regulations regarding involvement in corruption may have an 
impact upon corruption as a risk factor.  
2.3.3 Political Instability 
Political instability is not the same as political risk (Kobrin, 1978: 114). As Robock notes, 
Political instability, depending on how it is defined, is a separate although related 
phenomenon from that of political risk (Robock, 1971: cited in Kobrin, 1978: 114). Political 
instability and political uncertainty are a part of political risk and can be regarded as one 
criterion that points toward the probability of political risk occurring (Brink 2004: 19). 
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According to Howell, cited in Brink (2004: 19), Political uncertainty results from an 
inadequacy of information, whereas political risk is rather a more objective measurement 
of the amount of doubt, in contrast to the more subjective nature of instability and 
uncertainty .   
In a politically unstable country or region, there is a higher potential for violence or 
physical conflict occurring than in a politically stable environment. This would be a political 
risk that investors should be advised to either manage or avoid operating in the instable 
context (Brink, 2004: 19). According to Brink (2004: 19), The underlying risk that political 
instability holds for a foreign organization is the possibility that political disequilibrium might 
result in governmental limitations on producing profits . In political risk analysis, political 
instability would function as a variable in assessing the political risks of a country. 
However, it is important to note that political instability doesn t necessarily pose a risk to all 
businesses. Certain industries may not be affected or specific companies may be 
geographically located in a safe place.  An example could be an offshore oil company that 
is not directly affected by political instability on land. This happened in Nigeria on several 
occasions, where onshore companies were affected by rebel groups, whilst offshore 
companies noticed little of the trouble. Political instability is therefore only important if it 
may be a constraint to the actual or the potential business operations (Kobrin, 1978: 114). 
For that reason, political instability belongs to the environment, whilst risk is a property of 
the firm (Kobrin, 1978: 114). The next section examines the difference between political 
risk and country risk. 
2.3.4 Country Risk  
Country risk is frequently confused with political risk because both notions are related to 
analyzing and measuring the potential for loss or gain of a business. However, it is 
important to note that country risk analysis and political risk analysis are two different fields 
of scrutiny. Firstly, country risk relates to potential financial losses due to changes or 
problems that occur at the encompassing country level (Brink, 2004: 19). The main focus 
is on the financial and market situation of a country, as well as the linkages to the global 
economy. Country risk is concerned with establishing a countrys debt service ration, loans 
as percentages of gross domestic product, the size of reserves, or capital and current 
account credentials (Brink, 2004: 23). Secondly, the usual instruments that are included in 
country risk are balance of payment sheets, country credit worthiness, and data on debt 
servicing ratios. Country risk is usually practiced by credit rating agencies that tend to 
apply quantitative econometric models and have a focus on financial analysis. The country 
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level (or macro level, which will be elaborated on in sub-section 2.3.7) is the focal point of 
country risk, as well as the interrelation and interdependencies of global markets.  
Credit rating companies have complex measurements to estimate the profitability 
under varying financial scenarios. However, few have rigorous means to incorporate the 
range of outcomes that might arise from political risks inherent in the international 
business activities. Shifts in the political landscape may change the regulatory 
environment, such as local attitudes to corporate governance, reaction to international 
competition, labour laws, and withholding and other taxes (PWC, 2006). These are all 
examples of what country risk does not incorporate, but factors that are included in political 
risk.   
Another example may be if a country is unwilling to service the interest on debts. 
This would pose a certain degree of risk to lend money to this country. Country risk does 
not go as far as analyzing the political unwillingness. To assess whether the repayment is 
due to intended (un)willingness and (in)ability to repay is the mission of political risk 
analysis. Brink summarizes the distinction between political risk and country risk as 
follows, Country risk implies a countrys inability to repay loans, whilst political risk relates 
to a country s willingness to do so. Levels of political risk in a country are not necessarily 
pegged to levels of country risk and vice versa. A country can experience relatively little 
country risk, but relatively high levels of political risk . (Brink, 2004: 23)  
Brink (2004) argues that it is important that country risk factors should also be 
incorporated in a political risk analysis. The global economy has significant impacts on 
several layers of every country, which may in turn have political implications. At the same 
time, businesses are vulnerable to the reactions of countries that seek to temper the pace 
and impact of globalization on their institutions and workforce. Due to the clear 
interlinkages between political risk and country risk, they should always be incorporated in 
an analysis. The next section elaborates on the two methodological ways to conduct a 
political risk analysis.  
2.3.5 Quantitative Analysis versus Qualitative Analysis 
As mentioned above, political risk analysis is multi-disciplinary and based upon socio-
political factors. The normative nature of political risk analysis does not allow for complete 
objectiveness. Some political risk agencies operate solely with qualitative methods and 
apply them in models or matrices. However, many political risk analysts attempts to 
quantify traditionally subjective political, economic and social phenomena and apply them 
into mathematical models. In political risk analysis, both quantitative and qualitative 
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methods can be used, even hybrid versions have been constructed into political risk 
models.   
Both quantitative and qualitative research conjectures from empirical details of 
social life. Neuman (2006: 460) distinguishes between the two concepts as follows; 
Quantitative research(ers) conceptualize variables and refine concepts as part of the 
process of measuring variables. By contrast, qualitative research(ers) form new concepts 
or refine concepts that are grounded in the data . Strauss and Corbin (1991: 11) describe 
qualitative research as findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification . The qualitative method has the advantage of presenting a totality of various 
variables, which gives an increased understanding of contexts and relations (Holme and 
Solvang, 1998). In political risk a large amount of variables interrelate and the qualitative 
method has the advantage to set these apart. However, qualitative research is by nature 
exposed by the subjectivity of the researcher and the result may depend on the sensitivity 
and experience of the person conducting the study (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 17).   
Many companies find that quantitative methods reduce the subjectivity bias of 
merely using the qualitative methods (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 31). Nevertheless, it 
is important to underline that a quantitative approach in risk analysis is usually not 
significantly more objective since the quantified variables derive from subjective opinions 
(Ting, 1988). Ting (1988: 145) defines quantitative approaches to risk assessment as any 
analytical procedure that is based on data that can theoretically lend themselves to 
statistical or mathematical operations . In political risk analysis the quantitative procedure 
is based on conducting qualitative data into mathematical variables. It is challenging or 
sometimes unattainable to quantify political risk because of the difficulty of controlling all 
the variables and replicating the original conditions (Lindeberg and Mørndal, 2002: 3). 
However, for the sake of systemizing and gaining a more comprehensive overview of the 
political risk, quantitative research is more feasible.  
The measurement and observation of political risk depends to a great extent on 
subjective human judgement. In order to balance the subjectivity in the analytical 
procedure, political risk makes use of a model that can reflect researched information in a 
more objective estimation of risk (Brink, 2004: 2). Brink argues that a mathematical 
quantitative model can measure qualitative givens and present calculated results of a 
political risk analysis (Brink, 2004: 5). Also, according to Brink the country specific and 
comparative analyses should be combined with so-called soft political, social and even 
environmental factors. Soft variables can be empirically observed, measured and 
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translated into numbers and equations and be represented in a compounded result as a 
calculated risk (Brink, 2004: 6).  
The most obvious distinction between quantitative and qualitative political risk 
analysis is the way models are used. Yet a few key points should be mentioned on what 
they have in common. Both models include micro risks within a macro environment. The 
models are usually industry specific and exclude risks that do not pose a relevant threat. 
Also, both risk models cater for the specific client and include factors that contribute to 
validity and reliability of the analysis, which will be indicated by the clients needs. The skill 
for both quantitative and qualitative measures is to find the factors and indicators that are 
relevant for the risk of the investor s sector and needs. This thesis will be based on 
qualitative research and qualitative methods. The next section stresses the distinction 
between forecasting and prediction.   
2.3.6 Forecasting versus Prediction 
With regard to political risk analysis, an important distinction must be underlined between 
forecasting and prediction. A prediction implies that particular events will occur within a 
specific timeframe. A predicted statement states something for certain and accurate and is 
comparable to a prophecy. Political risk analysts do not predict that risk will occur or when 
it will happen. This is because certain elements of the analytical process prevent the 
prediction of specific events (Brink, 2004: 27). Also the analytical method and model does 
not allow for precise prediction. The projection of outcomes from a given situation can only 
be probable, because a model that is designed by selected risk factors does not 
necessarily simulate the complex set of circumstances (Brink, 2004: 27).   
Forecasting, on the other hand, implies an estimate of something that may happen 
in the future. By forecasting, the analysis assesses the probability of whether a given 
country might pose a certain degree of risk. Where a prediction seems more definite, 
forecasting includes a probability factor and is based on sound rational basis, empirical 
evidence scientific theory and systematic, formal procedures of information gathering 
(Brink, 2004: 28). Political risk analysts stress that there will always remain a possibility of 
an unforeseen event that is outside the scope of analysis factors (Brink, 2004: 28), such as 
a natural catastrophe.       
Brink (2004: 27) suggests that for political risk analysis anticipating or 
forewarning are even more preferable terms to use. The reason lies in that an additional 
element is present in the connotation of these words, that of partial information. Political 
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risk analysts attempt to anticipate a probability that risk will occur after careful observation. 
It becomes evident that the dynamics of the political environment require the political risk 
analyst to constantly be on top of the changes that occur. The final sub-section illustrates 
the difference between macro and micro risk.  
2.3.7 Macro Risk versus Micro Risk 
In political risk analysis there are many specific types of risks to assess, which originate in 
a wide range of political processes (Brewer, 1981: 11). Macro and micro risk represent two 
different levels that are both used for the political risk analysis. Macro level regards major 
sectors of society, entire societies or regions and focuses upon processes that occur 
between these levels (Neuman, 2006: 61). Micro level regards the smaller sectors of 
society, often the domestic dynamics or limited dimensions within a country. Kobrin 
defines macro- and micropolitical risks as follows: (M)acrorisks (are) environmental 
events, which affect all foreign firms in a country without regard to organizational 
characteristics, and microrisks ..are industry, firm, and even project-specific (Kobrin, 
1981: 253: in Alon et al., 2006: 626). Another way of looking at macro versus micro risks 
can be factors that are of internal origin (from inside a country) and that can pose micro 
(specific) risks, and/or external origin (from outside a country) and pose macro (generic) 
risks (Brink, 2004: 1).   
Macro risk in political risk analysis can be defined as unanticipated and politically 
motivated environmental changes (that) are broadly directed at all foreign enterprise as 
opposed to micro risk as the environmental changes (that) are intended to affect only 
selected fields of business activity or foreign enterprises with specific characteristics
(Fitzpatrick, 1983: 250). However, both micro and macro risk can emerge from events that 
may or may not be in the control of a host government.   
Macro level political risks are concerned with the large-scale situation of a country 
or the potential changes that may occur. Macro political risks will affect all businesses in a 
specific country. Some examples are: the geo-political situation of a certain state, the role 
of a state in the global economy and international regimes, the balance of payment, 
regulatory changes, war declarations and government composition changes. These events 
may pose risks to investment that can alter the intended objective for a business or the 
way it is conducted.   
Micro level political risks are industry-specific risks that are relevant for the given 
investment because the impact is only on a certain industry. In this study, the terms micro 
risk and industry-specific risk can be used interchangeably.  
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Yet, political risk analysis includes both macro and micro risks, as they are 
continuously entangled. The coupling of local, national, and regional political events often 
means that events at the local level may have follow-on effects for stakeholders on a 
macro level and vice versa. As will become apparent with regards to corruption, these 
levels are all relevant for the full analysis.  
2.4 Contextualizing Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry  
(For oil companies in Nigeria,) kidnapping is just a cost of doing business. Ethnic militants 
often kidnap their staff and demand money or jobs (and) oil firms really do hire people to 
gunpoint, or at least pay them to go away. Shell, the largest operator in Nigeria, said that 
10% of national oil output is lost to thieves, who puncture pipes to get at the contents. But 
these expenses are bearable. It still costs under $5 a barrel to pump Nigerian crude, so 
the oil firms will stay . (Another Day at the Office, 2003, quote from Alon et al., 2006: 623)  
This example from Shell s experience in Nigeria demonstrates one of the kinds of political 
risks of an  oil company s encounter in its international operation. In the ever-increasing 
flow of foreign investment in the oil and gas sector, companies compete in capturing an 
early market share, even in locales that may pose risky prospects. In the modern 
investment landscape there are several risks that can imply loss of profit. Investments in 
the extractive industries particularly oil and gas have proven to be sensitive to political 
events because of the visibility of petroleum operations, the importance of oil wealth and 
income to host governments and the vital role afforded to petroleum policies as the key to 
development (Lax, 1983: 29). Berlin (2003: 2) states that an Oil Company must be able 
not only to find hydrocarbons, it must be able to develop and produce those hydrocarbons 
at a reasonable profit over time . Political risk is therefore a significant phenomenon in the 
present day oil and gas investment environment, and companies are forced to dedicate a 
substantial amount of time and resources in carefully identifying potential risks and the 
means to manage these risks successfully (Alon et al., 2006: 624).   
The object of the first subsection is to briefly contextualize the oil and gas industry 
in general, in order to create an overview of the many segments involved in this industry. 
The second sub-paragraph will review the political risk involved in international oil and gas 
ventures. This is based upon the literature that focuses on the practical and industry-
specific material, as well as the literature that treats the historical changes of political risk 
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in the oil and gas industry. The aim  is to provide a more comprehensive and systematic 
illustration of specific factors affecting the oil and gas industry.  
2.4.1 Contextualizing the Oil and Gas Sector 
The oil and gas sector includes the oil and gas extraction industry as well as petroleum 
refining. Industries within the oil and gas extraction industry operate and/or develop oil and 
gas field properties. The activities that are included are everything from the phase of 
exploration for crude petroleum and natural gas; drilling, completing, and equipping wells; 
operating separators, emulsion breakers, destilting equipment, and field gathering lines for 
crude petroleum and natural gas; and all other activities in the preparation of oil and gas 
up to the point of shipment from producing property. The petroleum refining industry 
comprises establishments primarily engaged in refining crude petroleum into refined 
petroleum.   
The activity of the oil and gas sector is commonly divided into the exploration and 
production of oil and natural gas segment, referred to as Upstream . This segment 
includes cutting-edge geology to high-tech offshore drilling platforms. The other segment is 
referred to as Downstream , which includes refining and marketing. In practical terms, this 
includes transporting petroleum products by tanker trucks from thousands of local 
terminals to millions of service stations around the world, as well as the ownership and 
operation of those retail outlets. An integral part of the oil and natural gas industry are the 
companies that provide equipment, services, supplies, and design and engineering 
support for exploration, drilling, refining and other operations. Many are local firms, while 
others are global manufacturers selling products for operations around the world (API, 
2011).   
In all the segments involved in the oil and gas sector it is very important to do a 
political risk analysis, as there are many fractions in this industry that can be affected by a 
political change. The next section will contextualize political risk in the oil and gas sector.  
2.4.2 Contextualizing Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Sector 
Although there are many influential factors that are similar for every company operating in 
a particular country, the significance varies according to the industry and the concerning 
company, thus the micro risk involved (Alon et al., 2006: 625). Political risk for international 
oil and gas ventures is a broad concept, encompassing the non-commercial landscape 
(Bolous, 2003: 15). By and large, there are a number of political risks to an oil and gas 
company that can be identified along several fronts: the prevalent legal rules and 
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regulations within a given country; war and security issues, governmental economic and 
fiscal policies; the existence of trade barriers; and so on (Alon et al., 2006: 625). All these 
risks relate to the host government, its policies and the domestic environment. However, 
certain political risks weigh more heavily to the oil and gas industry, than what they do to 
investors in other industries. For example, a banker might consider the balance-of-
payments situation to have a greater bearing on his investment decision, whereas the risk 
of potential wars has a greater impact for the oil producer (Alon et al., 2006: 625).   
Energy vulnerability, oil embargoes, environmental activism, and restrictions on oil 
exports can be identified as micro- or industry-specific variables that solely affect the oil 
and gas sector. For an oil and gas company, the unit of analysis is thus both the macro 
and the micro risks; however, it is vital to lay special emphasis on the specific micro 
variables that may affect them to a greater degree (Alon et al., 2006: 633). As will be 
arrived at in the next chapter, corruption can be identified as both macro and micro risk; 
however, in this study it will be treated as a micro risk, as the focus will only be on 
corruption related to the oil and gas sector. By this is meant that the study will 
predominantly look at specific instances and places where the industry encounters 
corruption.   
In the assessment of political risk in the oil and gas industry, the relationship 
between the oil and gas company and the host country is of specific importance. Host 
governments assertiveness of control over their respective national economies has 
centred on the issue of national resources, in particular oil and gas resources (Lax, 1983: 
7). Almost every major oil and gas -production agreement abroad has been subjected to 
renegotiation or unilateral alternation in favour of the host country. In a simplified 
description, the bargaining advantage is initially with the oil company but continuously 
moves in favour of the oil-producing country. As the bargaining power of the host grows, 
the firm is exposed to an increased degree of political risk (Lax, 1983: 30). The past 50 
years has empirically verified a logical result of the increasing bargaining power of host 
governments, by the change in demands on the part of the hosts (Lax, 1983: 31). In the 
pre-exploration stage of a project, oil companies usually assume the burden of the initial 
capital outlays involved. After a commercial find, involving expenses that often surpass 
tens of millions of dollars, the political risk is often so high that a host government will alter 
the terms of an agreement (Lax, 1983: 7). As Chapter Three will demonstrate, there is a 
risk of corruption entering the scene in the bargaining stage (as well as in many other 
stages); a typical situation is during the license tendering process.  
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Lax (1983: 7) states that Host governments of all political complexions, and states 
spanning the gamut from the Third World to the industrialised nations, have intervened to 
play a larger role in the development and disposition of their petroleum and natural gas 
resources . According to Berlin (2003), the political system of a host country, be it 
capitalist, Marxist, socialist, nationalist, monarchy, or democracy, does not affect the 
political risk of the investment. Oil and gas companies have worked in and with host 
countries with all these political systems, sometimes with great success. Democracy or 
autocracy, North or South, when it comes to regulating foreign involvement in a states 
petroleum and natural gas resources, countries tend to pursue similar goals of maximising 
domestic economic returns and control (Lax, 1983: 7). Political risk in the oil and gas 
sector should rather be seen as changes to the political and socio-economic conditions of 
the host country from those that existed at the time the agreements in question were 
originally entered into (Berlin, 2003).   
Important for the oil and gas industry is the level of stability in the host country. Oil 
and gas companies are influenced to a large extent by risks of wars and external threats, 
taxation systems, terrorism, civil and labour unrest, corruption, governmental regulations, 
repatriation restrictions, political instability, energy vulnerability, and environmental 
activism, to name a few (Alon et al., 2006: 631). It is important to focus on the potentially 
significant managerial contingencies that result from political events or processes and not 
the events themselves. Political risks are the corresponding effects of political 
circumstances. An oil and gas firm must be concerned with how change in the political 
environment will affect that company s interest and not lose sight of the particular political 
risks, with their tangible results (Lax, 1983: 10).   
Political risks in the oil and gas industry can be classified in terms of the issues 
involved. Risks can be typed as transfer, operational, administrative/statutory, ownership, 
or contractual (Lax, 1983: 10).  Transfer risks are concerned with the possibility of 
government restrictions with respect to the transfer abroad or into the host country, of 
capital, profits, technology, personnel, equipment, or the actual commodity produced. 
Operational risks concern the potential of government takeover of operations, or that 
government control may be used to the detriment of the companys interests. The 
administrative/statutory risks are only relevant to direct investment projects. It includes the 
likelihood that changes in the regulatory climate will affect a project or agreement. 
Ownership risks involve questions of equity shares and issues of participation, 
expropriation, and nationalisation. Contractual risks encompass the supply/price issues 
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embodied in non-equity, non-service-agreement transactions (Lax, 1983: 11). As will 
become clear in Chapter Three, corruption can occur in a range of forms and situations. 
Therefore, all the above-mentioned political risk types in the oil and gas industry are 
relevant when identifying corruption as a political risk factor for the oil and gas investor.   
The omnipresent political risks of international operations makes it difficult for 
companies to neglect political risk assessment and risk management strategies on a 
continual basis (Alon et al., 2006: 632). Oil and gas companies must adopt specific and 
comprehensive political risk assessment and strategies with regards to their country of 
origin and their country of investment. The company itself must judge the impact of political 
risk, determine the parameters for deciding on political risk, assess its own level of political 
risk tolerance and, in the final analysis, decide whether political risk will be manageable. 
Accepting to deal with political risk varies from investment to investment, as Berlin (2003) 
argues, there is usually a direct correlation between the degree of political risk that a 
company is prepared to accept, and the degree of geological potential of the proposed 
area .  It is ultimately only the company itself that can decide whether or not to invest in an 
international oil and gas venture (Bolous, 2003: 15). Regardless, political risk analysis can, 
to a large degree, map out the expected risks involved and assist in the decision-making of 
an oil and gas company.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the theoretical framework for the discipline of political risk 
analysis and key political risk concepts. It has pointed out certain key aspects and 
distinctions of political risk analysis. In this context, it has been crucial to establish what is 
meant by risk and risk for businesses in a political context. Political risk has been defined 
and distinguished from the notion of political instability. Further on, the difference between 
political risk and country risk has been emphasized. This study will only focus on political 
risk. Quantitative and qualitative analysis in political risk has been discussed as well as 
common methodological problems encountered in political risk. The difference between 
forecasting and predicting political risk and the difference between macro risk and micro 
risk have briefly been addressed.   
The second part of this chapter has been dedicated to a general overview of the oil 
and gas sector and dealt with industry-specific political risks in this sector. Although there 
are many influential factors that are similar for every company operating in a particular 
country, the significance varies according to the industry and the company concerned. A 
political risk analysis draws the attention to the political risks that can affect the profitability 
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of the investment and help solve the questions that arise, of where to invest or expand 
operations .  
As mentioned above, Alon et al. (2006: 625) argue that political risk for international 
oil and gas ventures can be identified along several fronts. Corruption, which is the focus 
of this study, is a phenomenon that can occur in several spheres of a country and translate 
as a political risk factor for an investor in the oil and gas industry.  The following chapter 
will examine the phenomenon of corruption and create an outline of how it manifests as a 
political risk for the oil and gas industry.  
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Chapter Three: Corruption as a Political Risk Factor in the Oil 
and Gas Industry  
3.1 Introduction 
In February 2009, US oil services company Halliburton and its former subsidiary KBR 
agreed to pay a penalty of US$579 million. This is the largest fine ever paid by a US 
company in a US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), exceeded only by the Siemens 
fine4. FCPA is one of the three major anti-corruption instruments that empowers the US 
authorities to prosecute US companies and individuals for paying bribes to foreign 
officials5. The Halliburton/KBR case involved a series of bribes paid to secure contracts to 
build a natural gas plant in Bonny Island, Nigeria. In September 2008, Jack Stanley, who 
served as KBR s CEO and chairman, pleaded guilty to FCPA offences: he could face a 
seven-year prison sentence.  (Control Risks, 2009a: 3).   
Most international companies have long accepted bribery as necessary for doing 
business in less developed economies where public officials had substantial control over 
contracts, licenses, and foreign investment decisions. Until recently, most Western 
countries even allowed bribery payments to foreign countries as legitimate business 
expenses (some still do). Times are changing, however, and the anti-corruption movement 
is growing in the business world.   
This chapter will present an overview of the broad spectre of corruption and then 
move on to explain how corruption constitutes a political risk factor for oil and gas 
investors. Built upon generic indicators, the thesis will present an industry-specific matrix 
that can be used as a tool to measure various degrees of corruption as a political risk for 
oil and gas investors. The next section will present the consequences for business 
involvement in corrupt activity. The third section will move on to discuss corruption, based 
upon the works of researchers who have investigated this area in the last twenty to thirty 
                                                 
4 Siemens agreed to pay a record $1.34 billion in fines in December 2008 after being investigated for serious bribery. The investigation 
found questionable payments of roughly 1.3 billion, from 2002 to 2006 that triggered a broad range of inquiries in Germany, the United 
States and many other countries. Siemens has been listed on the New York Stock Exchange since March 2001, and was therefore 
required to comply with the provisions of the FCPA (Control Risks, 2009: 3). 
5 FCPA first came into force in 1977 and empowers the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to prosecute the US companies for paying bribes to foreign officials. The FCPA also covers foreign companies that are listed on 
the US stock exchanges. The US has been particularly strict in enforcing its anti-bribery legislation, but other countries are catching up. 
In 1997, all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) signed an Anti-bribery 
Convention whereby they undertook to implement similar legislation to the FCPA.  
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years, and arrive at a definition that is most suitable and directed towards the oil and gas 
industry. The fourth section will then range seven generic indicators that constitute 
corruption as a political risk factor. Based on the generic indicators, industry-specific 
indicators for the oil and gas industry will be presented and ranked in a matrix that 
illustrates how it can be used to measure the level of risk of corruption for the oil and gas 
investor. The final section of this chapter concludes.  
3.2 The Growing Focus upon Corruption in Foreign Investments 
Since the early 2000s, corruption has become the centre of attention on the corporate 
agenda in several countries. This has largely been due to pressure from NGOs, 
government implementation of laws prohibiting corrupt practices, international institution 
efforts to set international benchmarks for anti-bribery legislation and attempts to set a 
global standard. Demand for diagnostic data and analysis on corruption continues to grow, 
which in turn has an impact on awareness-raising and policy-making processes (Wolkers 
and Hakobyan, 2004: 2). Think tanks and business associations are constantly working to 
raise public awareness of the problem of corruption. They are involved, together with 
representatives of public and private sectors, along with members of the international 
community, in drafting voluntary codes of corporate governance (Shkolnikov, 2002: 5).   
Civil society has also gained considerable impact as conscious consumers and 
customers that demand transparent business operations. Thus, there has been a 
significant upsurge in national and international anti-corruption practitioners that exchange 
information, experiences, training, agenda-setting and networking. As a result, laws and 
regulations related to the involvement with corruption have become embedded in national 
and international policies, and an intensified enforcement of criminal justice prohibitions. 
The US and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries actions against foreign companies have become all the more effective because 
of increased co-operation between US investigators and their foreign counterparts.  
Being involved or associated with corruption can have dramatic consequences for a 
company, both financially and with regards to the reputation of the company. Examples of 
a company s down fall, such as Enron in late 2001 and WorldCom, could both be traced to 
corrupt acts by senior executives. These executives misused their power for personal 
gains, and in so doing, destroyed the wealth of many of the shareholders, brought losses 
to pension funds, and also cost the jobs of innocent employees (Neelankavil, 2003). Both 
Enron and WorldCom were sent to bankruptcy.  
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Where corruption is relatively common in the oil and gas sector, its consequences 
can take many forms. There are direct consequences, such as loss of revenues, poor 
technical standards of operation, sub-optimal oil recovery or premature termination of 
production in an area. There are, in addition, many indirect consequences of corruption in 
an investment country that can affect the business and interest of the investor. This 
includes lowered investment in the country and retarded economic growth, capital flight, 
political decisions on resource allocation across sectors and industries, competition effects 
in the market, the design of the tax system, reduced aid flows, loss of tax revenue, 
adverse budgetary consequences, lower quality of infrastructure and public services, and 
a distorted composition of government expenditure (Al-Kasim, Søreide and Williams, 2008: 
8). To generate growth, businesses must use their capital resources productively. All bribe 
payments shift money away from potentially productive investments in the business. When 
capital is drawn away into non-economic transactions, this negatively affects the business 
growth, as well as the marketplace in general. Corruption also distorts growth incentives 
by forcing out potentially better producers of goods and services (Webster, 2002: 11).   
All the major industrialised countries now have laws against foreign bribery that are 
similar to the US FCPA. However, the critical question is how effectively laws are 
enforced. The answer, even now, is that the application of anti-corruption laws will remain 
highly inconsistent. According to Control Risks (2009: 1), we can expect a continuing trend 
towards tighter enforcement in the US and, to varying degrees, in other Western countries 
as well as Japan. However, greatly due to political reasons, the pattern of enforcement will 
remain highly uneven, both among the industrialised countries and still more in developing 
and transition economies (Control Risks, 2009a: 1).   
As a natural consequence, it is this inconsistency that presents the greatest 
challenge for mainstream international oil and gas companies with regards to corruption. 
They cannot afford to ignore tighter legal enforcement, particularly if they are based in an 
OECD country, the US, or are listed on US stock exchanges. At the same time, they are 
still required to compete against rivals, many of whom are less careful on corruption 
matters, including countries with poor or uneven standards of governance (Control Risks, 
2009a: 1). Several oil and gas companies now fear that their company will be affected by 
or associated with corruption, and they invest more time and resources to avoid getting 
involved in corruption. Political risk analysis is one of the tools developed to forecast a 
situation, and can warn against a certain probability that corruption exists in a certain 
place. Traditionally, corruption has been accepted as no more than a cost of doing 
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business in many countries, but as mentioned above, there have been considerable 
changes to this view.   
Corruption takes place in industrialized, developing countries and less developed 
countries, even though the degree of corruption may vary from one group to another and 
from one place to another (Neelankavil, 2003). Since international business transcends 
many countries and cultures, understanding and studying corruption is a challenge. The 
challenge occurs when international companies with one set of rules and codes of conduct 
in their home country operate in countries that may have a different set of rules, especially 
if the host country s rules are less stringent than the ones in their home country. This 
ultimately presents a risk to the investor and the remaining part of this chapter will explain 
how corruption manifests as a risk and how it can be detected.  
3.3 Defining Corruption in the Oil and Gas Sector 
Mankind with its proclivity for power and wealth has always succumbed to corruption in 
one form or another and also today various levels of corruption are common in most parts 
of the world (Neelankavil, 2003). Based upon rational choice theory, economic incentive 
theory suggests that an agent calculates the expected payoffs of corruption. Specifically, 
the agent is assumed to gauge the benefits of corruption, such as the size of the bribe or 
the amount embezzled, versus the risk of being caught and the ensuing sanction and other 
market-related losses. Sanctions may include fines, imprisonment, dismissal and 
associated loss of income, as well as informal sanctions, such as injury to reputation. The 
risks are determined by the probability of being caught, multiplied by the consequences 
thereof. According to the economic incentive theory, the agent chooses corruption over 
honest conduct, where, in such calculation, the benefits outweigh the risks (Al-Kasim, 
Søreide and Williams, 2008: 31).   
Corruption is rampant in the business world, and internationally it is even more 
pervasive, as it affects many aspects of business, from cost of operations to business 
relationships, and even government-to-government relationships (Neelankavil, 2003). 
Susan Rose-Ackerman (in Elliott, 1997: 31) suggests that corruption arises from the 
interdependence of the economic and political spheres. Whenever a public official has 
discretionary power over distribution to the private sector of a benefit or cost, incentives for 
bribery are created. Thus corruption depends on the magnitude of the benefits and costs 
under the control of public officials (in Elliott, 1997: 31).  
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According to Shkolnikov (2002: 7), corruption can be regarded as a twofold 
phenomenon; a supply-side and a demand-side. The supply-side of corruption involves 
those parties that are providing money payments, gifts or other types of expressing 
gratitude for services. On the other hand, the demand-side of corruption is represented by 
those parties that are accepting those forms of payment and provide some form of service 
or favour in return (which can also include a denial of a service) (Shkolnikov, 2002: 7). 
Ultimately, corrupt practices must be analyzed from the perspective of the two parties that 
negotiate such agreements within a specific institutional framework as a condition for the 
fulfilment of a particular transaction.   
The challenge that usually emerges when defining corruption, is how to differentiate 
corruption from other types of payments, favours, transactions or similar activities.  For 
example, how does one differentiate corruption from mere patronage politics or favouritism 
for electoral reasons, since the basic assumption underlying political economy work, in 
general, is that officials use their office not only to maximise social welfare, but to serve 
their individual interests. Another example can illustrate the problem of defining corruption; 
when a customs official demands a bribe for letting a product enter the country duty-free, it 
is corruption, but what about when a politician decides whether or not to devalue based on 
whether it will suit his political supporters? The challenge with understanding corruption 
lies in the fact that it not only covers many different types, but also has a vast number of 
definitions that have been put forth by various agencies and researchers. Definitions also 
cover different contexts, and the definition for the purpose of this thesis only looks at the oil 
and gas industry.    
Interestingly, the most commonly used definitions of corruption assign equal 
importance to offering , receiving , and soliciting of gifts or bribes (Neelankavil, 2003: 
5). Table 1 is adopted from Neelankavil (2003: 5) and presents the five most commonly 
used definitions of corruption and the name of the agencies that define it and a 
summarised version.  
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Table 1 
Definition of Corruption as Defined by a Particular International Organization 
# International 
Organization that 
defines it 
Definition of Corruption 
1 The United Nations 
(UN)  
Commission or Omission of an act in the performance of or in 
connection with one s duties, in response to gifts, promises or 
incentives demanded or accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these 
once the act has been committed or omitted
2 Organization for 
Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development 
(OECD) 
The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to 
influence the action of a public official in the procurement process 
or in contract execution . 
3 Transparency 
International (TI) 
The misuse of entrusted power for private gain . TI further 
differentiates corruption according to rule . In the first instance, 
the definition covers all the areas in which the receiver is required 
by law to receive some form of compensation (bribe), and in the 
second instance, the receiver is prohibited from providing some of 
these services and therefore is not entitled to any compensation 
(bribe) 
4 World Bank and 
Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Corruption involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public 
and private sectors, in which they improperly and unlawful enrich 
themselves and/or those close to them, or induce others to do so, 
by misusing the position in which they are placed .  
5 Law Library s 
Lexicon 
An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent 
with official duty and the rights of others. It includes bribery, but is 
more comprehensive; because an act may be corruptly done, 
though the advantage to be derived from it be not offered by 
another.
6 Summarized 
definition based on 
the above  
When a public agent or person in power uses his or her position 
to gain for themselves and/or those close to them by acting 
improperly or misusing their given powers and thereby 
compromising the trust that is entrusted in them and in so doing 
gives an unfair advantage to the person or persons who initiated 
the gift or provided the said gains .  
(Table: Neelankavil, 2003: 5)  
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Although there is no international consensus on the definition of corruption, a 
popular way of differentiating corruption is by its scale (OGC, 2008: 6). According to the 
Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) (2008: 6), petty corruption refers to street-level, everyday 
corruption that ordinary citizens experience as they interact with low/mid-level public 
officials. Grand (or political) corruption generally involves much larger sums of money and 
people that abuse public office or public positions for private gain. An example could be 
defence contractors paying billions of dollars to lawmakers for awarding major defence or 
transportation projects. At the other end of the spectrum are the huge campaign 
contributions to politicians or the contributions to government leaders and can be referred 
to as influence peddling (Elliott, 1997: 177).   
It is useful to distinguish between types of corruption. Elliott (1997: 177) provides a 
useful stylization (see Figure 1). The actors involved in a country have been divided into: 
private actors, elected politicians, and non-elected public officials identified as bureaucrats 
and the judiciary.   
Figure 1 (Elliott, 1997:177)               
Neelankavil (2003: 3) makes a further distinction that he classifies as business corruption 
and political corruption. Table 2 is adopted from Neelankavil (2003: 3) and presents the 
two different types of corruption:  
Non-elected 
officials
Private 
Actors
Elected officials 
And politicians  
Influence 
Peddling 
Petty 
Corruption 
Grand  
Corruption   
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Table 2: Types of Corruption 
# Type of Corruption  Example Predominantly 
Found in: 
1   Business corruption 
*Bribing officials  
*Accounting irregularities 
*Tax evasion 
*Insider trading 
*Money laundering 
*Embezzlement 
*Falsifying documents (research data)   
Most countries 
2   Political corruption 
*Voting irregularities 
*Holding on to power awaiting the will 
of the people 
*Nepotism and cronyism 
*Rule of the few   
Mostly in developing 
and less developed 
countries  
(Table: Neelankavil, 2003: 3)   
Although some seek to provide a formal comprehensive definition of corruption, this 
study is not strictly designed to define corrupt activity per se, but rather deploy a definition 
to isolate those activities that are the subject of this thesis, namely corruption for the oil 
and gas investor. In that regard we already have the general framework of how corruption 
occurs in the business sector (see Table 2), and thereby we can establish a definition of 
corruption in oil and gas investments.  
3.2.1 Defining Corruption in the Oil and Gas Industry 
As mentioned above, the definition and discussion of corruption for this thesis only focuses 
on industry-specific political risk analysis, with specific reference to the oil and gas 
industry. In order to arrive at an appropriate definition of corruption in the oil and gas 
sector, this study will first establish who the relevant actors involved are. As has been 
demonstrated, most definitions of corruption start with the premise of abuse of power 
(Neelankavil, 2003). In the context of corruption occurring in the oil and gas sector, there 
are three main actors: The Principal, the Agent and the Client. The Principal represents 
the entity that has the authority to grant and approve projects, such as a government 
agency. In the oil and gas industry, the Principal is likely to be the Ministry of Oil and Gas, 
the parliament or the state owned national oil company (NOC). The Agent is the civil 
servant, which is the intermediary who represents the Principal and is actually responsible 
for granting the licence or the permit on behalf of the Principal. The last actor is the Client, 
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which is the company or the individual who seeks a grant or permit for projects or 
investments a business entity (Klitgaard, 1991). Figure 2 demonstrates this relationship 
in a triumvirate.   
Figure 2  
Key Actors in International Business Corruption  
Principal      
Agent Client  
The model demonstrates that corruption occurs when the civil servant/public official 
(Agent) betrays the interests of the government agency (Principal), and accepts gifts 
and/or money from the oil and gas company or the individual representing the company 
(Client) to grant a favour to the company without any thought for the fairness of such 
favour. Corruption in the oil and gas industry can also stem from the government agency 
(Principal) going directly to the company (Client). To put this in the larger context, 
government officials who have a lot of discretionary powers and (often, but not always) 
operate in environments where the system of checks and balances is weak or non-
existent, characterize the demand-side. The supply-side, on the other hand, is often 
represented by businesses, such as the oil and gas sector, which is willing (or sometimes 
forced) to provide monetary and other forms of payment to the government officials for the 
services provided or denied (Shkolnikov, 2002: 7).   
An example that illustrates this is when Aibel Group Ltd., a British engineering 
company, pleaded guilty in 2008 to an FCPA charge of paying bribes to the Nigerian 
Customs Services via international freight forwarding and customs clearing agent, and 
agreed to pay a fine of US$4.2 million. The payments were made to secure preferential 
treatment, such as reduction of duty, and not only to speed up clearances. Secondly, the 
fact that the payments were made via an intermediary in this case a freight forwarding 
agent does not exempt the client company from liability. The case of Aibel Group Ltd. is 
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one of a series of cases where both US and foreign companies have been charged for 
bribes paid to customs officials (Control Risks, 2009a: 5).   
The most common form of corruption met by oil and gas companies directly is 
financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes connected 
with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or 
loans (Brink, 2004: 86). These examples pose a political risk and can make it difficult for oil 
and gas companies to conduct business effectively.   
The principle-agent-client theory forms the basis of how to define corruption in the 
oil and gas industry. For the purposes of this study, corruption in the oil and gas industry is 
broadly defined as the use of public office for private gains accrued from the oil and gas 
investor, but with the following limitations: First, the definition is confined to business 
corruption; that is, where the receiver of the corrupt payment is a government official or 
civil servant, and the briber is the company (representative)6. Secondly, activities between 
the oil and gas investor and the government official/civil servant that can be perceived as 
corrupt in the sense that they lead to a personal benefit or a permission/license in the oil 
and gas industry, but which are conducted without involving a process of negotiation with 
any other external party. Acts that are conducted unilaterally, such as crime, and 
particularly theft, is excluded in this definition. The third limitation is with respect to the 
nature of the gain accumulated to the government official. This will be considered to be 
pecuniary in kind and direct, where the benefit takes on a negotiated and precise valuation 
(although the benefit may be accrued at a later time). Cultural and social variables will also 
not be included in the definition.   
In order to detect the level of existence of corruption in a country of potential 
investment, corruption as a risk factor must reflect something measurable. These 
measurements are done by the help of indicators. An indicator can say something about 
how much or how many or to what extent or what size . Furthermore, an indicator 
provides evidence that a certain condition exists or certain results have or have not been 
achieved. Once an analyst knows what to look for, the issue of where to look for it 
becomes slightly less complicated (Brink, 2004: 77). The next section will show how the 
research is operationalised by introducing the indicators that have been chosen for the 
generic matrix. A risk factor and its indicators can be designed and chosen to be industry-
                                                 
6 The reference is to the Principal and the Agent, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  
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specific (Brink, 2004: 77). Based upon the generic indicators, the industry-specific 
indicators will be used to create a measurement of corruption in the oil and gas industry.  
3.4 Indicators of Corruption in the Oil and Gas Industry 
In this section the political indicators of corruption will be presented. The first subsection 
introduces generic indicators of corruption that manifest as a risk to business operations. 
The generic indicators are based on specific literature that treats causes of corruption. 
This literature has contributed as building blocks of the generic indicators that will be 
presented. The literature concerned is by the following authors: Al-Kasim, Søreide and 
Williams (2008), Tanzi (1998), Goudie and Stasavage (1998), Alt and Lassen (2008), Brink 
(2004), Kennedi and Di Tella (2001), Webster (2002), Azfar and Nelson (2007), Schedler 
(1999), Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000), Uslaner (2007), Transparency International 
(2011), Global Integrity (2011) and Neelankavil (2003).     
The generic indicators represent those that foreign investors are most concerned 
about and that most investors have in common, regardless of which industry they want to 
invest in. This can be regarded as a first-tier operationalisation of the research by creating 
a basis of how to pinpoint the industry specific indicators. Based on the generic indicators, 
industry-specific analysis can be whittled down for any investment climate, and parameters 
can be specified for any such climate (Brink: 29-30). The industry-specific indicators of 
corruption in the oil and gas industry follow each generic indicator. The industry-specific 
indicators can be regarded as second-tier operationalisation, where the indicators are 
specified to the oil and gas industry, and ranked into a matrix in the second sub-section.    
3.4.1 Generic and Industry-Specific Indicators of Corruption in a 
Country  
This thesis will use indicators that are related to the national political and institutional 
structure of the country of investment. Particular aspects of the national structures are 
anticipated to play a major role in explaining patterns of corruption in different countries. 
Furthermore, these structures are instrumental in defining opportunities for corruption at 
the institutional level and determines the (in)ability of individuals to exploit such 
opportunities. For this study, what matters is the manner in which the regime interacts 
with, and exercises political control or influence through, the institutional structures. It is at 
the institutional level that oil and gas investors are likely to encounter corruption that is 
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relevant to their risk assessment. The general impression left by literature is that political 
institutions matter for the prevalence of corruption.   
Closely related to the political and institutional structures of a country, is the 
regulatory framework. Regulatory frameworks in the oil and gas sector determine the 
revenues and responsibilities for actors involved in the industry, including the private 
sector and the government. By defining certain requirements regarding exploration, field 
development activities, technologies applied, the number of operators, the role of National 
Oil Companies (NOCs), and monitoring opportunities, this framework sets the scene for 
the industry s activities. Variations between countries in how well the oil industry functions 
depend not only on the robustness of the regulatory framework, but also on the efficiency 
and the capacity of the regulatory institutions. One explanation for weak oil and gas sector 
performance is corruption in the countrys regulation of the sector (Al-Kasim, Søreide and 
Williams, 2008: 8).   
Based on the political and institutional structures and regulatory framework of a 
country, seven key indicators have been identified and these are considered in detail 
below. The number of indicators that identify corrupt practices and the interrelationships 
between these indicators will help to conceptualize and ultimately operationalise corruption 
as a risk factor.   
3.4.1.1 Separation of Powers 
The principle of separation of powers is the model where the legislative, executive, and 
judicial functions of government are divided among separate and independent bodies. The 
intent is to prevent the concentration of power and provide for checks and balances. In 
other words, this indicator refers to the division of government responsibilities into distinct 
branches to limit any one branch from exercising the core functions of another. A 
government of separated powers assigns different political and legal duties to the 
legislative, executive and judicial departments. This means that while the legislature has 
the power to make laws, the executive branch has the authority to administer and enforce 
the laws so made. Separation of powers implies the need for multiple actors to propose, 
initiate, or manage the agenda, and is, in constitutional design, considered a necessary 
bulwark against tyranny. The procedure of checks and balances, for example through 
vetoes, judicial review, or regulatory oversight, has the aim of ensuring policy moderation 
and preventing misuse of political power. Separation of powers, in combination with 
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various forms of checks and balances, constitutes a crucial safeguard against corruption of 
government. Although the functions and powers of legislatures vary within respective 
political systems, the power to pass legislation is vested in this institution, thus supposedly 
negating instances of executive dictates of policy decrees (Brink, 2004: 89). For instance, 
Alt and Lassen (2008: 37) argue that judicial independence is of central importance for the 
judiciary s role as a watchdog of the other branches of governments. Azfar and Nelson 
(2007) have found that directly elected law enforcement officers work more vigilantly at 
exposing corruption than those that are appointed. In particular, it appears that elected 
attorneys generally collude less often with the executive.   
Tension between separation and concentration of powers will always exist, and the 
greatest danger will always lie with the executive arm, because in the executive lies the 
greatest potential and practice for power and for corruption. Political appointments to the 
civil service and the designation of key officials by political leaders are characteristic of 
highly politicised civil services in which collusion between political and administrative 
decision makers may become explicit, and even open, rendering the mechanics of 
implementing acts of corruption considerably easier (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998: 123). 
Generally, the risk of exposing corrupt activity will increase as the degree of separation of 
powers increases and where the motivation of senior civil servants does not encompass 
political considerations. 
Separation of Powers - Industry Specific 
It is relevant to the oil and gas investor to look at the degree of autonomy and 
independence of legislative, executive and judicial powers in the investment country. The 
degree of autonomy of the ministry or body regulating the oil and gas industry is the focal 
point of this indicator. There is a higher degree of risk associated with countries where the 
oil and gas sector is controlled directly by the government, than an independent body. 
Furthermore, the degree to which the legislature, executive and the judiciary check and 
balance powers indicates the extent of opportunity for government and public officials to 
demand bribes from the investor in negotiations and renegotiations, in the various phases 
of investment. This is prone to occur in countries with weak regulatory governance of the 
oil and gas industry, or where an independent regulatory body for oil and gas does not 
exist at all. An independent body controlling the oil and gas sector can ensure standards, 
fair competition, compliance and best international industry practices. This indicator is 
closely linked to the indicator measuring judicial structures.  
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3.4.1.2 Monopoly Power and Discretionary Power  
The role of the state is often carried out through the use of numerous rules or regulations, 
where government offices must be contacted to authorize all sorts of activity, such as 
acquiring licenses, permits, investing, engaging in trade, and so on (Tanzi, 1998: 566). If 
only a few officials are given monopoly to authorize or inspect the activities in a country, 
they can use their public power to extract bribes from those who need authorizations or 
permits. The question of whether officials have monopoly power over provision of a 
national good can indicate the incidence of corruption. These officials may refuse the 
authorizations or may simply sit on a decision for months or even years. Thus, they can 
use their public power to extract bribes from those who need the authorizations or permits. 
Surveys from various countries indicate that much of the time of managers of businesses 
is spent dealing with public bureaucracies.   
The existence of regulations and authorizations generates the need for frequent 
contact between the investor and bureaucrats, and it also requires an enormous amount of 
time to be spent in dealing with public officials. The time that is taken away from the 
business to operate can be reduced through the payment of bribes (Goudie and 
Stasavange, 1998: 117). In some countries, individuals become middlemen or facilitators 
for obtaining permits and granting authorizations. In India, for example, the expression 
licence raj referred to the individual who sold the permits needed to engage in many 
forms of economic activities (Tanzi, 1998: 566). The fact that an authorization can be 
obtained only from a specific office or individual that is, there is no competition in the 
granting of these authorizations gives the bureaucrats a great amount of power and a 
good opportunity to extract bribes (Tanzi, 1998: 566). Conversely, the presence of 
competition reduces opportunities for corruption on the part of public officials. When more 
than one government agent can issue the same license, competition among different 
officials will drive the bribe price down to zero (Goudie and Stasavange, 1998: 118). 
Another measure to combat corruption would be if a country has anti-monopoly policies 
and procedures to enforce them.   
The greater the amount of discretion which is given to an agent, the more 
opportunities there will be for agents to give favourable interpretations of government 
rules and regulations to businesses in exchange for illegal payments (Goudie and 
Stasavage,1998: 118). If a public official has discretionary power over distribution to the 
private sector of a benefit or cost, incentives for bribery are created. Thus, corruption 
depends on the magnitude of the benefits and costs under the control of public officials 
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(Kennedy and Di Tella, 2001). Strict rules and regulations that spell out all the details of a 
particular decision would be the antidote to the problem of excess discretion (although this 
assumes that formal rules are actually followed). There are examples where rules can be 
made too rigid or too unrealistic, inciting non-compliance, and a large amount of de facto 
discretion for officials.  General tolerance towards discretionary decisions and informal 
solutions will contribute towards a climate of acceptance of corrupt practice.   
Monopoly Power and Discretionary Power Industry Specific 
If one or two individual ministers hold monopolistic power in relation to certain decisions, 
the risk of corruption is far greater than in democratic countries where more ministers and 
their ministries are involved in budget preparation and control (as opposed to leaving the 
main decisions to the finance minister or to the minister of energy or oil). In this case, 
manipulation of licence tendering processes may be a risk. Often there are important clues 
that make it possible to assess how far a tender is likely to be rigged. These include very 
short deadlines, vague evaluation criteria, or on the other hand, very narrow specifications 
that may be designed to favour a particular oil and gas investing company.   
There are several agencies that the oil and gas investor has to deal with throughout 
the investment process. Examples can be certain authorizations in the operational phase. 
If these officials concerned have monopoly power, they may refuse the authorizations or 
merely sit on a decision for a long period, which can be very costly for the oil and gas 
investor. Thus, they can use their public power to require bribes from the investor who 
needs the authorizations or permits.  
Discretionary decision-making will always carry the risk of being marred by 
corruption. The importance of discretionary decision-making processes should not be 
underestimated; however, if rules in the oil and gas industry are too rigid it may rather 
encourage manipulation of the award system.  A good balance between discretion and 
rigid rules is the best way a country can control corruption by some combination of 
discretion with good information laws.   
In order for an oil and gas company to get access to the resources of a country, 
permits are needed. A government system and appropriate legislation are required to 
ensure this occurs in an orderly way. If this is not regulated by law, a licence contract for 
oil and gas exploration or production is often used instead that will include details related 
to these permits, and will usually replace active regulation for the given concession period. 
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Such arrangements can involve considerable corruption risks. Where oil and gas investors 
are coerced into accepting framework conditions embedded within a contract instead of in 
formal legislation, the regulatory capacity of the state is likely to be diluted (Al-Kasim, 
Søreide and Williams, 2008: 15). 
3.4.1.3 Monitoring, Accountability and Transparency 
The framework of monitoring, accountability and transparency concerns checks and 
oversight for surveillance and institutional constraint on the exercise of power. 
Furthermore, it concerns the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain 
what they are doing; as well as the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions 
on powerholders who have violated their public duties (Schedler, 1999: 13). Accountability 
according to Schedler (1999: 13) embraces three different ways of preventing and 
redressing abuse of political power. It implies subjecting power to the threat of sanctions; 
obliging it to be exercised in transparent ways; and forcing it to justify its acts .    
Failure to rotate agents between posts, failure to use outside auditors, and lack of 
consultation of clients of a particular bureaucratic agency are three important aspects that 
increase opportunities for corruption. Countries that have measures to avoid corruption, 
streamline the functions of the industry regulatory agencies with the purpose of eliminating 
overlaps for effective operations monitoring. This is particularly important to remove 
bureaucratic bottlenecks that encourage corruption in the oil and gas sector. 
Asymmetries of information present challenges for the government (the Principal) to 
monitor the actions of government agents in carrying out an assigned task. If there is no 
oversight, corruption may very likely go unabashed (Neelankavil, 2003). A reliable and 
effective measure for monitoring and accountability is to employ independent control 
agencies in a country, such as outside auditors. Furthermore, it requires a stable set of 
regulations for governing licensing, inspections, as well as enforcement mechanisms that 
ensure accountability of private firms to their shareholders and capital markets. Another 
issue concerns the appropriate level of penalty to apply to officials who are caught.   
The level of transparency is also essential in detecting and combating corruption. 
Without a substantial transparent system, it will allow government officials to maintain 
obscure or secret budgetary accounts (Webster, 2002: 13). Absence of transparent, 
accountable public institutions and regulations creates the opportunity (and the incentive) 
for corrupt transactions (Webster, 2002: 15). Transparency is also challenged if there is no 
free press, and as a result, many misdeeds go unreported. Furthermore, if citizens and 
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non-state actors, such as Civil Society Organisations (CSO), cannot hold the government 
accountable for financial transactions, corruption may go unabated.  
Monitoring, Accountability and Transparency Industry Specific 
This refers to the effectiveness of the national institutional structures of the investment 
country to monitor oil and gas production and enforce basic regulations and contracts. 
There is a high risk of corruption if there is no design of rules and criteria for the pre-
qualification phase or the license tendering. A corrupt bureaucracy has incentives to refer 
to regulatory frameworks as flexible and as of less importance than personal contacts. It  
thereby also has less transparency in the oil and gas sector about how rules should be 
understood. Countries are prone to have fewer occurrences of corruption if they have 
clearer and more transparent information that can be given to firms and foreign 
governments about what rules exist and how they should be respected, as well as the 
presence of enforcement mechanisms. Other preventative measures in the investment 
countries are good monitoring opportunities, such as the presence of accountable public 
institutions and regulations. Oil producing countries should also allow investigation units to 
operate independently. Lastly, the level of transparency, when it regards license bidding, 
negotiations, revenue streams and conditions behind licence contracts, is an important 
indication of level of corruption in an investment country.  
3.4.1.4 Judicial Structures 
The judicial system can play an important role in limiting corruption both at the highest and 
lowest levels of government by monitoring both civil servants and politicians, and by 
holding them accountable in the event of wrongdoing. The degree that the judiciary can do 
this is largely determined by the separation of powers. Political leaders who maintain very 
tight controls over the judiciary and law enforcement sector will typically have the capacity 
to undertake corrupt acts with impunity. In some countries, even if the risk of detection at 
the highest levels is significant, and, at the extreme, corrupt acts are openly 
acknowledged, their costs of that exposure will typically be small, both in terms of any 
legal sanction and in terms of the repercussions for political responsibility (Goudie and 
Stasavage, 1998: 124).   
The potential role of the judiciary to tackle corruption also depends on the 
effectiveness of the security and law enforcement officials in the implementation of the law, 
as much as the integrity and management of the security and law enforcement officers 
themselves (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998: 124). Moreover, it is the de facto nature of 
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these elements that will ultimately be most crucial in this context, rather than the strict 
constitutional or legal situation.  
Corruption is likely to occur in the absence of dependable legal machinery for 
preventing arbitrary application of regulations and laws. When the legal system fails, it 
becomes a hot bed for corruption, as there are no penalties for misuse of funds, and at the 
same time, the ones who loose out do not have any recourse for appeals (Neelankavil, 
2003: 6). Countries that can better control corruption have a rational set of laws governing 
the operations of private business, the protection of property rights, and the enforcement 
of contracts. They also have an efficient judiciary (and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) mechanisms) for sorting out contract disputes. 
Judicial Structures Industry Specific 
All countries with oil and gas resources have some level of legislation in place. A first step 
is therefore to review existing legislation and identify serious deficiencies in the framework 
conditions and/or deviations between practices and regulations in the oil and gas industry. 
The incidence of corruption is more likely in a country that operates with a regulatory 
framework that is embedded in the licence contract, rather than in government decrees, 
regulations or in the general body of law. The opportunities for changing licence terms are 
stronger where regulation is contract-based, thus making the situation more prone to 
corrupt demands. In countries with adequate regulatory legislation, petroleum contracts 
tend to deal strictly with commercial terms, and the scope for revision is thus considerably 
narrower. Formal rules and regulations are extremely important, even if they are being 
violated and irrespective of political will for reform, or the benevolence of political leaders. 
If not respected, they nevertheless set the stage for what practices should have been, and 
provide a benchmark for evaluation and indication of corruption in a country. Whether the 
court system functions efficiently and neutrally or whether there are bottlenecks, is a 
further important indication of the judicial structures impact upon reducing and controlling 
opportunities for corruption. 
3.4.1.5 Capture Economy 
A capture economy is one where payment of bribes, in an attempt  to shape the policy and 
legal environment, are common variables in the states decision-making procedures. An 
example could be a business manager buying a decision outcome that will favour his 
enterprise and create better growth opportunity for him (Webster, 2002: 5). In this type of 
economy, decision makers frequently abuse their position and offer up their influence to 
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solicit support from business in the form of cash or gifts. Public sector corruption also 
perpetuates a kind of illicit hierarchy and creates informal systems of kickbacks and 
patronage that perpetuate corrupt practices and inefficiencies (Webster, 2002: 12). The 
capture economy is an economy where officials expect companies to capture public 
officials at various levels of the state to extract concentrated rents and to purchase 
individualised provision by the state of public goods. The private gains to capture are 
clearly associated with substantial social costs in capture economies both in terms of 
overall economic performance and the capacity or commitment of the state to provide 
critical public goods for the development of the market economy. In a capture economy 
there is generally a lack of transparency, competitive and legitimate channels of voice and 
influence for enterprises, complemented with monopolisation, political competition and 
political accountability (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000).  
Capture Economy Industry Specific 
In a capture economy there is a tendency among politicians and civil servants to view oil 
and gas resources as a convenient source of rents for amassing personal wealth and 
securing political patronage. Public officials seek to sell their influence and power to the 
highest bidder. In the capture economy, public officials and politicians privately sell under-
provided public goods and a range of rent-generating advantages a la carte" to individual 
firms. When the state under-provides the public goods needed for entry and competition, it 
may require "captor" firms to purchase directly from the state. A critical element in the 
extraction of petroleum resources is the contract between the government and the oil 
company. A government that wants to exploit the country s oil reserves through inviting 
international oil companies must decide on what type of contractual system is most 
appropriate. Basically, the options are concession/license agreements, joint ventures, or 
production-sharing agreements. The contract terms are vital to a government s effort to 
reap the benefits of its natural resources. However, there are pitfalls in the process of 
developing, negotiating and renegotiating contracts, where all phases are potentially prone 
to be exposed to corrupt activity. Also, politicians can, on  short notice, change the rules of 
the game through altering prevailing regulations and laws.  
3.4.1.6 Inequality and Development 
The economic environment contributes to the evolution of corruption to the extent that 
established economic strategies and policy instruments, together with institutions for the 
implementation of economic policy, provide different opportunities for the pursuit of corrupt 
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practices (Goudie and Stasavage, 1998: 125). Macro-economic fundamentals, such as 
budgetary planning, control of budget balances, execution and expenditure oversight at 
government level are essential in controlling corruption. An economic dependence on one 
sector makes the economy vulnerable. A diversified economy makes it less prone to 
corruption. Development plans that benefit civil society in a clearly articulated policy 
framework, as well as visible results of these development plans, are important to avoid 
civil society frustration. If the state manages to deliver dividends of development, such as 
general wealth creation and employment generation, it will create a greater trust and 
hence less corrupt activity. Furthermore, a large inequality between rich and poor in a 
country, often lays foundations for corrupt activity. Successful or well-ordered 
democracies are marked by high levels of trust in co-citizens and in government, low 
levels of economic inequality, and honesty and fairness in the public sphere. Trust in 
government is essential for political stability and compliance with the law. Corruption robs 
the economy of funds and leads to less faith in government as well as fellow citizens, and 
thus lowers compliance with the law (Uslaner, 2007: 1). Contributing to the emergence of 
corruption lies the unequal distribution of resources in a society. Corruption thrives on 
economic inequality. When just a few members of the population live lavishly, leaving the 
rest to barely manage, it can lead to corruption by necessity. This means that poor 
citizens income is predominantly based on acquiring bribes for doing various services and 
jobs (Webster, 2002: 12).  Economic inequality therefore provides a fertile breeding ground 
for corruption, and, in turn, it leads to further inequalities (Uslaner, 2007: 1).  
Inequality and Development Industry Specific 
The inability to promote growth and development from oil and gas revenues indicates huge 
failures on the part of governments in oil- and gas-rich countries. These failures have 
many domestic explanations, including the undue influence of power constellations and 
elites, large income inequalities amongst the population and more clear-cut forms of 
corruption, such as bribery and graft. Economic dependence on the oil and gas sector 
instead of a diversified economy makes the economy vulnerable and more prone to 
corruption. Transferring the oil and gas revenue of the country into substantial value-
adding activity for the overall economy and society is a huge contribution to lay certain 
foundations for avoiding corruption. The oil and gas contract terms usually determine how 
much a producing nation earns from its natural resources, and whether a government will 
have the regulatory authority to enforce environmental, health, and other standards that 
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apply to the contractors. Contract terms may also be critical for the development of 
suppliers and contractors in the host state and hence the build-up of technological 
competence, local capital and creation of jobs. On the other hand, the contracts should not 
scare off oil and gas investors (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 57).   
The indication of corruption can furthermore be detected by looking at a country's 
long-term perspectives on the development of domestic institutions, plan of development 
from oil and gas revenues, conditions on local content, and moderate rates of oil 
development. These are all aspects that may be critically important for a countrys effort to 
reduce corruption risks.  
3.4.1.7 Perceptions of Corruption 
An indirect indicator of corruption is the perceived existence of corruption in a country. This 
can give good information about the actual prevalence of corruption of a country or an 
institution in a country. Many useful surveys measure perceptions of corruption rather than 
corruption per se. Countrywide surveys are available from the following organizations: 
Global Competitiveness Report (Geneva); Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (Hong 
Kong); Transparency International (Berlin); and Political Risk Services (Syracuse). The 
results obtained from these surveys are widely used by researchers and businesspeople.   
Transparency International conducts some of the best-known and useful surveys to 
foreign investors. These include the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB). The CPI ranks countries based on perceptions of the level of 
corruption. The index is a compilation of surveys amongst businesspeople and analysis of 
researchers. The perceptions that are collected make the CPI an important contribution to 
the understanding of differences of the corruption spectre between different countries (TI 
Norway, 2009). The GCB is a world-encompassing measurement of attitudes and 
experiences of corruption. As a measurement of opinions it gives a good indication of how 
corruption affects civil society and individuals on a national level. The GCB further includes 
a range of corruption-related problems, such as which institutions are perceived to be the 
most corrupt (TI Norway, 2010).   
It is important to keep in mind that these indexes reflect perceptions and not 
objective and quantitative measures of actual corruption (Tanzi, 1998: 578). However, a 
good feature is that the various indexes available are highly correlated among themselves 
and can thereby be a good indicator of corruption being a risk factor. Useful information 
can be obtained from case studies of corrupt agencies such as tax administrations, 
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customs and police. Unfortunately, while there are many such studies, often the reports 
are internal and are kept confidential.  
Another useful indicator can be obtained from the Global Integrity Report. It is 
important to emphasize that the integrity indicators of this report do not measure 
corruption, but rather assess its opposite, that is, anti-corruption and good governance 
institutions, mechanisms, and practices. The Global Integritys methodology differs 
considerably from the metrics such as CPI, by mobilizing a highly qualified network of in-
country researchers and journalists to generate quantitative data and qualitative reporting 
on the country s anti-corruption framework, rather than only focusing on perception 
surveys. Each country assessment contained in the report comprises two core elements: a 
qualitative reporter s notebook and a quantitative integrity indicators scorecard.   
The scorecard assesses the existence, effectiveness and citizen access to key 
governance and anti-corruption mechanisms through more than 300 actionable indicators. 
It examines issues such as transparency of the public procurement process, media 
freedom, asset disclosure requirements, and conflicts of interest regulations. Scorecards 
take into account both existing legal measures on the books and de facto realities of 
practical implementation in each country. A lot of the data and information gathered by 
CPI, GCB and the Global Integrity Report are collected from businesspeople involved in 
the oil and gas sector (Global Integrity, 2011).  
Perceptions of Corruption Industry Specific 
The most relevant indexes for perceived corruption in the oil and gas industry are good 
indicators for real corruption in an investment country of oil and gas. The available indexes 
are, as mentioned above, Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Global Corruption 
Barometer (GCB) and the Global Integrity Report. These measures are based on 
aggregates of third-party data dealing with perceived levels of corruption, indicators of 
governance outcomes and expert assessments of governance and anti-corruption 
performance. 
The next section will present all the indicators and the levels of risk in a matrix.  
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3.4.2 The Matrix: Corruption as a Political Risk for the Oil and Gas Investor 
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3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has firstly presented the consequences for business involvement in corrupt 
activity. Corruption was discussed in general terms, before it was established how 
corruption constitutes a political risk factor for oil and gas investors. The chapter arrived at 
a definition that is most suitable and directed towards the oil and gas industry. Seven 
assorted indicators were presented, in which they constitute corruption as a political risk 
factor specifically for the oil and gas industry. Finally, a matrix was presented in order to 
illustrate how it can be used to measure the level of risk of corruption for the oil and gas 
investor. The next chapter will apply the matrix to measure the level of corruption in 
Nigeria.  
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Chapter Four: Applied Theory: Corruption as a Political Risk 
for the Oil and Gas Investor in Nigeria.  
4.1 Introduction  
Nigeria is sub-Saharan Africas largest oil producer with reserve levels that far exceed 
those of its neighbours. Oil and gas accounts for approximately 40 percent of the GDP, 95 
percent of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65 percent of government revenues 
(Amundsen, 2010: ix). The oil boom of the 1970s led Nigeria to neglect its strong 
agricultural and light manufacturing bases in favour of a dependence on crude oil. New oil 
wealth, the concurrent decline of other economic sectors, and a lurch toward a non-
dynamic economic model, generated massive migration to the cities and led to 
increasingly widespread poverty, especially in rural areas. Along with the ubiquitous 
malaise of Nigeria's non-oil sectors, the economy continues to witness massive growth of 
"informal sector" economic activities, estimated by some to be as high as 75 percent of the 
total economy. While oil dominates the Nigerian economy and generates the vast majority 
of government revenues, the country is perceived as one of the most corrupt countries in 
the world, and significant levels are said to exist within its oil and gas sector. The complex 
and largely opaque operations of the oil industry make it difficult to establish exactly how, 
when and to what extent corruption exists within this sector (Gillies, 2009: 1). However, 
this chapter will apply the matrix from Chapter Three in order to try to establish exactly 
this; to determine levels of corruption in Nigeria and to what extent it is present in the oil 
and gas sector in the country. 
4.2 Measurement of Indicators  
By applying the matrix from Chapter Three, this section will attempt to measure the level of 
corruption as a political risk for the oil and gas investor. The following subsections will 
apply each of the seven political risk indicators to illustrate the current situation in Nigeria 
and how this measures the level of corruption for oil and gas investors in Nigeria.    
4.2.1 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Separation of 
Powers  
The Nigerian political system is a federal structure with vertical separation of powers. In 
this sense, governmental powers are shared between the central government and the 
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fringe governments (federal states). The sub-division into ever more federal states was 
initially a divide and rule strategy, but the state governments have now come to enjoy a 
significant degree of independence from the federal level, and have become a growing 
check on presidential power. There are some frictions, however, between the demands of 
states for autonomy and self-rule and the federal centre for control. The federal states are 
responsible for about half of all government spending (some estimates up to 60 percent). 
However, the transfer of funds to the states is likely to be a major source of corruption in 
the country. The federal government has taken some small steps towards political and 
economic reform, but federal officials have tolerated and often encouraged the rampant 
power abuse at the state level in order to benefit themselves (Amundsen, 2010: x). The 
federal government and the state governors execute real power. However, most 
institutions within the administrative system suffer from rather low political skills and 
corruption, and, especially on the level of the local governments and also the state 
assemblies, from insufficient funding and very poor administrative capacity (BTI, 2010: 3).  
In the current constitution, 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
separation of powers is a fundamental constitutional principle. However, the president of 
Nigeria is both head of state and head of government, and of a multi-party system. The 
government exercises executive power, and legislative power is vested in both the 
government and the two chambers of legislature, which are the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. Together the two chambers make up the law-making body in Nigeria 
called the National Assembly. The National Assembly serves as check on the executive 
arm of government. The highest judiciary arm of government in Nigeria is the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria.   
However, there is no complete and total separation of powers, as the three 
branches are not completely sealed off from each other (Oraegbunam, 2005). For 
instance, the president or the governor shares the law-making power of the legislature by 
virtue of the constitutional provision for presidential or governors assent to bills before 
they become laws (Oraegbunam, 2005). Another major exception to the separation of 
powers is the presidential power to issue executive orders in some areas that derogate 
from the powers of the judiciary to impose sentence after a due process of adjudication 
(Oraegbunam, 2005).   
There are many examples of acts that violate provisions of the 1999 constitution, 
which are in direct collision with the separation theory. Although there is a separation of 
functions, there is not a clear separation of functionaries (Oraegbunam, 2005). The 
judiciary is formally independent, and increasingly acting as a check against arbitrary acts 
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at the political level. The courts have managed remarkably well to self-improve, despite a 
challenging political environment, and form the most promising body that can rule against 
corruption cases. However, as will be mentioned later, the judiciary also has a long way to 
go in order to not be tainted by political influence (Amundsen, 2010: x).  
There are four government institutions that run Nigerias oil and gas industry affairs: 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); Ministry of Petroleum; the president and 
his advisors; and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). The NNPC is Nigeria s 
national oil company and controls a large part of upstream and downstream activities and 
its expansive functions include the operation of 12 subsidiaries. The most crucial 
subsidiary is the National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS), which 
acts as the industry s concessionaire, entering into contracts with oil and gas companies 
on behalf of the government. Given the size of personnel, budget, and mandate, and its 
high share of industry expertise, the NNPC is the lead government actor in the oil and gas 
sector (Gillies, 2009). The Ministry of Petroleum technically oversees NNPC and leads oil 
sector policy-making. Investigations show that while Olusegun Obasanjo served 
as President of Nigeria he also served as the Minister of Petroleum (1999 to 2007) and 
had powers to legally and illegally order the NNPC leadership to take orders from him and 
do what he wanted, including releasing of funds to him, without any questions asked. 
Several corrupt Nigerian politicians see oil-blocs and funds from NNPC as personal 
entitlements that should be shared amongst the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
leadership and stakeholders (Republic report, 2011). The WikiLeaks bombshell in 2011, 
alleged from US-diplomatic cable, revealed that the NNPC (beginning under former 
president Obasanjo s administration) allocated US$ 1.00 per barrel of Nigerian oil sold as 
a type of personal payment or kickback to the president. By application, Nigerias 
president, Goodluck Jonathan, supposedly pockets around US$200 million monthly as his 
personal share of Nigeria s monthly oil earnings (Republic report, 2011). The DPR is the 
industry regulator. The department operate separately under the Ministry of Petroleum, 
whilst the NNPC retains some of the regulatory functions. DPRs mandate includes the 
allocation of oil blocks, the collection of royalties, the enforcement of sector regulations 
and other technical oversight tasks. The DPR, however, suffers from low capacity and the 
confusing assumption of regulatory functions by the NNPC itself (Gillies, 2009). Gillies 
(2009: 2) report that a number of criticisms have been raised regarding the ability of this 
set of actors to effectively execute their functions; weak DPR capacity, NNPC intrusion into 
regulatory and policy-making functions, lack of NNPC oversight and accountability, and 
weak incentives for efficiency and performance.  
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The political system still faces serious problems in terms of state coherence, 
institutional efficiency of the government system, patterns of democratic representation 
and attitudes and the enforcement of the rule of law (BTI, 2009: 2). The questions of 
political reform, democratisation and good governance is to a large extent a question of 
the degree to which the institutions of checks and balances can withstand and reduce the 
patrimonial and rent-seeking pressures in the country  (Amundsen, 2010: x).  
Comparing the situation in Nigeria to the indicator of separation of powers in the 
matrix, the political risk predominantly matches a high level of corruption for the oil and gas 
investor. Although there is a separation of functions in Nigeria, there is not a clear 
separation of functionaries. The oil and gas resources have given the ruling elite both the 
incentives for controlling the state apparatus (and thus the income), and the means to 
retain control of the state. Several corrupt Nigerian politicians see the oil revenues and 
funds from the NNPC as personal entitlements. There is a major lack of NNPC oversight 
and accountability as to what regards the oil and gas revenues as well as patrimonial and 
rent-seeking pressures in the country. Despite real progress in a very small number of 
fields, such as the judiciary, that retain the opportunity to act as a check on the legislative 
and executive, there is still need for major improvements. There are indications that the 
current leadership is neither willing nor capable of pushing forward the necessary 
structural reforms, particularly within the power and refinery sectors, towards real and 
tangible improvements (BTI, 2010: 3).   
High risk 
4.2.2 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Monopoly 
Power and Discretionary Power 
In political terms, the dominance of oil and gas in the Nigerian economy has led to a 
narrow revenue foundation that has lent itself to rent-seeking and elite capture , where the 
driving logic of governance is the allocation of resources and opportunities in ways that 
strengthen the position of those in power. Nigeria s Petroleum Act gives the Minister of 
Petroleum full authority over the allocation of licenses for the exploration, prospecting and 
mining of oil. There are, therefore, no legally mandated processes or oversight 
mechanisms for the allocation of blocks (Gillies, 2009: 2). The ruling elite are in control of 
the state apparatus, which still has a monopolistic structure in key segments of the 
economy (power generation, petroleum refining, import and production of highly 
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subsidized fuel) (BTI, 2010:7). Political and commercial elites are closely intertwined and 
ownership structures are often opaque. Companies that have extensive contact with the 
government, or that work in areas considered of primary strategic interest to the 
government, are at the greatest risk of becoming involved in corruption in Nigeria. Private 
business interests of government officials, who are frequently in strategic sectors such as 
the oil and gas industry, can create conflicts of interest and problems can arise if 
companies seem to be setting up in competition with them (Control Risks, 2009b: 5). 
Therefore, it is difficult to predict the outcome of specific cases because the rapidly 
evolving nature of power politics, and business and political relationships. Acquiring 
intelligence requires the right mix of alertness on the part of the oil and gas investor 
(Control Risks, 2009b: 15).   
The existing legal framework grants discretionary authority to top officials and does 
not clearly delineate roles and responsibilities among the sectors actors (Gillies, 2010). 
There is also no anti-cartel legislation as such; yet the slow but steady privatization trend 
and legislation promoting competition have, to a certain extent, broken state monopolies 
and state cartels (BTI, 2010:7). Administrative incompetence in conjunction with 
bureaucratic corruption still, however, takes its toll to the disadvantage of a competitive 
and enabling environment (BTI, 2010:7).   
The oil and gas sector legislation, Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), includes language 
that requires transparency and removes the discretion over block allocations permitted by 
the current Petroleum Act. The oil block bid rounds of 2005, 2006, and 2007 saw some 
efforts at replacing discretionary award procedures with more open and competitive 
process. The available blocks and bidding criteria were advertised and the round took 
place in public, with each bid announced before the attending audience. However, the 
result was that a number of companies lost their blocks after they bid large amounts with 
the expectation that they could be later negotiated downward. Thus, despite these 
improvements, transparency and due process appear to have fallen short before and after 
the rounds themselves. Guidelines for bidders and information regarding local partner 
requirements were released late. Preferential rights were awarded to some companies 
through non-transparent procedures and without regard for their actual technical capacity 
(Gillies, 2009). The aims to reduce discretion and improve transparency in these allocation 
processes were instead, in practical terms, flawed (Gillies, 2009). Licences to explore and 
produce oil and gas, contracts for oil and gas-related services and, more generally, 
government contracts funded by oil revenues all represent highly valuable assets. Bribery, 
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favouritism, and contract non-performance frequently mar these license and contract 
transactions in Nigeria (Gillies, 2009).   
Contracts and other expenditures above a low threshold require NNPC approval. 
Most contracts are subject to a three-tier approval process consisting of NAPIMS, the 
NNPC Group Executive Council, and the NNPC Board, with larger awards also requiring 
Federal Executive Council approval. The average time for the review of contracts is 24 
months, while the global industry average is closer to six or nine months. This bottleneck 
ensures that top NNPC officials remain the gatekeepers of the industry. Protecting this 
arrangement often contradicts profit maximisation within the national oil company. As a 
result, its functions remain inefficient, politicised, and susceptible to capture by individual 
interest (Gillies, 2009: 3).   
Also, many of the major international corruption cases reported in Nigeria involve 
the participation of an intermediary who passes on bribes to senior officials or politicians 
on behalf of foreign clients. Several cases have involved a series of high-profile corporate 
names, where in almost all cases the bribes were paid to Nigerian government officials via 
consultants or other intermediaries (Control Risks, 2009b: 6 and 9). Furthermore, 
according to a World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria in 2007 and interviews of 
business investors by Control Risks (2009b) firms, a high percentage of the respondents7 
reported that they were expected to give gifts to secure major government contracts. Also, 
many of the major international corruption cases reported in Nigeria involve the 
participation of an intermediary who passes on bribes to senior officials or politicians on 
behalf of foreign clients (Control Risks, 2009b: 7).  
Oil and gas service companies frequently confront costly delays and inefficiencies 
in their dealings with Nigerian state institutions. For instance, oil companies must gain 
approval and visas for each expatriate worker they employ; furthermore, they must import 
goods and equipment that involves port and customs delays and high-level jobs in 
customs and the port authority are widely perceived as immensely profitable for the 
officials who hold them. Although this does not constitute corruption per se, such delays 
create the motive and opportunity for greasing the wheels , or paying bribes to speed 
along procedures (Gillies, 2009: 3). Companies in a hurry may be tempted to offer bribes 
to officials in return for speeding up procedures. Malfunctioning or non-functioning 
administrative procedures create incentives for paying bribes.  Nevertheless, companies 
                                                 
7 The numbers are taken from the World Bank s Enterprise Survey for Nigeria, which was based on a 
survey of 1891 Nigerian firms in 2007, and Control Risks that have conducted interviews with a total of 
25 individuals in Nigeria, from a variety of backgrounds, but many from the oil and gas sector.  
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that refuse to pay bribes face other costs in the form of a heavy time tax in which they 
must be prepared for.   
However, it must be noted that regions within Nigeria differ when measured by the 
degree of rule of law, and the efficiency of their governments and administration. 
Moreover, certain agencies and ministries are also considered more honest and efficient 
than others. It is also important to note that there can be great differences even between 
departments within the same agency. The extent to which a tender will be clean and 
transparent is often very personality-based .  (Control Risks, 2009b: 18).   
Furthermore, demands from minor officials for small payments, sometimes 
characterised as dash , are commonplace throughout Nigeria. This could for instance be 
petty corruption like paying the police, or worse cases, hospital doctors for admitting 
emergency cases or fire brigadiers who demand money before responding to telephone 
calls. Obviously, in emergency cases like these, there is a general consensus that there is 
little choice but to pay (Control Risks, 2009b: 26).   
Measuring up to the matrix, the political risk of monopoly power and discretionary 
power in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria is high. The oil and gas sector is highly 
characterized by a rent-seeking and elite-capture situation, where only few government 
officials are given monopoly and authority over authorizations regarding the allocation of 
licences for exploration, prospecting and mining for oil. Despite efforts to create a more 
competitive environment, including in oil and gas, these are flawed, and the country 
remains a monopolistic structure of key segments of the economy relevant to the oil and 
gas industry. This is also largely due to the commercial elites that are closely connected to 
the political elites. What further makes this indicator a high risk is that the existing legal 
framework grants discretionary authority to top officials and does not clearly delineate 
roles and responsibilities among the oil and gas sector s actors. Bribery, favouritism and 
contract non-performance frequently tarnish the licence and contract transactions in 
Nigeria. Furthermore, there is frequent use of intermediaries or so-called consultants that 
pass on bribes to senior officials or politicians and constitute a high risk for oil and gas 
investors.   
High risk 
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4.2.3 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Monitoring, 
Accountability and Transparency 
Nigeria maintains institutions of restraint and control, including the ombudsman, 
parliamentary commissions, the Auditor General, the Attorney General and directorates. 
All these are playing some role in exercising political and economic control. One of the 
government watchdogs is the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and it has the constitutional 
mandate to fight corruption by receiving and checking the compulsory financial interest 
declarations of public officers. Although it took time before it actually started working 
(established in 1988), there is a substantial compliance today with the requirement for 
declaration of assets by public officials. Approximately 90 percent of the relevant public 
officials go through the process (Amundsen, 2010: 23). However, the assets declarations 
are not publicly available and the veracity of the declaration cannot always be 
independently confirmed due to the lack of human and material resources in the Bureau. 
Present president, Goodluck Jonathan, reconstituted the CCB in 2010 and declared that 
the government would have to go tough with corrupt officials . However, the effect of this 
reconstitution remains to be seen (Amundsen, 2010: 23).   
A second anti-corruption body is the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) and it is mandated to receive and investigate reports of 
corruption and in appropriate cases prosecute the offenders, to examine, review and 
enforce the correction of corruption-prone systems and procedures of public bodies. The 
ICPC has taken on some politically sensitive cases and demonstrated some degree of 
courage and independence (Amundsen, 2010: 23). Other anti-corruption bodies include 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), both with some success of pursuing corruption charges, 
however also under critique of inefficiency and lack of de facto independence. For 
example, the EFCC s credibility has been weakened by a widespread debate about how 
far it amounts to a political instrument used by the government to eliminate political rivals. 
For example, the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, is widely alleged to have used 
EFCC investigations as a tool to disqualify a number of his competitors in the run up to the 
April 2007 presidential, regional and National Assembly elections, though the majority of 
these individuals were never subsequently prosecuted (Control Risks, 2009b: 3).  
In Nigeria, the Auditor General is appointed by the president on the 
recommendation of the Federal Civil Service Commission and confirmation of the Senate. 
This ensures two different layers of quality control and also the relative independence of 
the audit agency. The auditor-general shall audit all public accounts and report to the 
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National Assembly; however, this report is not issued regularly and is also not accessible 
to the public. The government does not always act on the report of the auditor-general and 
in most cases the auditor-general does not initiate investigations (Global Integrity, 2008: 
80).   
There is a Public Complaints Commission, which has a formal organizational 
structure with offices in all the states of the Federation and which reports to the National 
Assembly. Completed cases with concrete recommendations are usually acted upon. The 
problem is that the agency lacks the capacity to investigate and address most of the 
complaints it receives. The Commission is furthermore under-funded and its resources are 
low (Global Integrity, 2008: 82). In practice, the legislators also lack the capacity and 
diligence for effective monitoring. Furthermore, resistance from government institutions 
also interferes with the process. (Global Integrity, 2008: 66).  
There are thus clear needs for reform of the controlling and monitoring institutions. 
In 2011, President Jonathan signed the Freedom of Information Bill (FOI), 11 years after a 
FOI bill was first submitted to the National Assembly in 1999. The law can provide a basis 
for a right to access information and resultant appeal process for oil and gas investors. 
Furthermore, it guarantees the right of access to information held by public institutions, 
irrespective of the form in which it is kept and is applicable to private institutions where 
they utilise public funds, perform public functions or provide public services. Furthermore, 
it requires all institutions to disclose basic information about their structure and processes 
and it provides protection for whistleblowers. The law also requires the Federal Attorney-
General to oversee the effective implementation of the act and report on execution of this 
duty to parliament annually (Freedom Info, 2011). In theory, the document has now 
become the official Freedom of Information law and is a great step for improving 
transparency in the country, by which it is possible for the public to seek access to official 
information. However, the law is very recent and it remains to be tested in order to 
establish how effective it is. If the law proves successful and is implemented on the same 
level in the oil and gas sector, it can provide oil and gas investors with more predictability, 
transparency and openness in their dealing with public officials.   
Nigeria has also established a number of institutions of specialised control, geared 
to the petroleum economy and petroleum-related problems, namely oil regulation, 
transparency, elections, and corruption. However, these institutions are all, more or less, 
subject to the political elites control of the state (Amundsen, 2010: xi). As mentioned 
earlier, there is the national oil company, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC, 
that is serving a multitude of purposes), the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
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and the Federal Ministry of Energy (Petroleum Resources, Power and Steel), all of which 
serve as petroleum sector regulators. The fact still remains that sector operations, 
including the activities of the NNPC, are subject to insufficient oversight (Gillies, 2009). 
Each year, the NNPC issues contracts and awards licences to international oil trading 
companies, several NNPC-affiliated companies, and a few foreign governments. These 
transactions yield high levels of fungible returns, and the lack of transparency surrounding 
them creates considerable opportunities for corruption (Gillies, 2009: 3). For instance, 
following a pre-qualification process for the licenses, it is not clear how winners are 
selected or how much the contracts are worth. Press reports allege that officials regularly 
receive payments by the companies involved (Gillies, 2009: 3). In other words, NNPC 
allocates contracts, which do not always follow advertised criteria or guarantee 
competitive pricing , and it handles the crude sales and remittances of proceeds without 
always remitting all revenues (Amundsen, 2010: 26). Nigerian government officials 
occasionally use bureaucratic bottlenecks to discourage investors. This is especially so 
when such officials have an interest in a particular business or industry (Control Risks, 
2009b: 15).   
The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), which is the 
national branch of the global initiative Extractive Industries, is also a petroleum sector 
regulator. Since its launch in February 2004, NEITI has enjoyed a strong political backing, 
and it has been relatively successful in collecting and publishing detailed data on the 
petroleum sector, but the implementation of the NEITI principles have been slow over the 
last years. However, hopes are high for a new political push for NEITI under the new 
president, Goodluck Jonathan (Amundsen, 2010: xi).   
The constitution guarantees freedom of association and peaceful assembly. Civil 
Society Organisations (CSOs) are generally allowed to register and operate legally. CSOs 
are furthermore free to offer opinions and engage with various aspects of the political 
process, including transparency and accountability. In some instances, their opinions and 
ideas are taken into consideration in decision-making, but usually they are not (Global 
Integrity, 2008: 12). For most of civil society in Nigeria, (non-state actors) issues relating to 
oil industry activity in Nigeria cannot be de-linked from the whole question of rights and the 
broader issues of governance and development (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 
40). It is therefore essential for the oil and gas investor that there is transparency and 
openness as to what happens with the oil and gas revenues, in order to avoid public 
discontent with their operations in the country. Several oil and gas companies have 
improved their engagement with civil society and CSOs, both acting as donors to certain 
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civil society projects and information about their role in the country. The fact that CSOs 
operate legally in Nigeria can be a positive tool for the oil and gas investor to function as 
an information channel to civil society.   
The constitution also guarantees freedom to own, establish and operate any 
medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions . The independent media 
increasingly criticises the government and its policies, and allows for robust public debate. 
However, there are some limitations on political issues in the state media and some self-
imposed censorship in the private media, and the quality of coverage and analysis in 
newspapers varies considerably. Besides, journalists are still subject to intimidation and 
violence when reporting on issues implicating the political and economic elite (Amundsen, 
2010: xi). Big private media owners are either politicians or have close ties to those in 
government. Stories of corruption are only allowed as long as they do not hurt the interest 
of the media owners or the interests of their close business associates (Global Integrity, 
2008: 21). As with CSOs, the media can play an important role in contributing to a more 
transparent system. If cases of corruption go unreported in Nigeria, the presence and 
possibility of locating corruption is harder to detect.    
Judging the level of corruption related to monitoring, accountability and 
transparency, the risk level is medium. The growing number of institutions and policy acts, 
which aim to increase the levels of transparency and monitoring possibilities, are 
contributing to reduce the possibility of corruption. Examples are the CCB, ICPC, EFCC 
and INEC. These institutions have demonstrated some success in pursuing corruption 
charges, and along with the FOI bill, there are promising prospects for improvements of 
transparency initiatives under the current president. However, the country is in need of 
major regulatory improvements, and less bureaucratic complications for the oil and gas 
investor. Furthermore, there are unclear rules and criteria in licence tendering, as it, for 
instance, is unclear how winners of licence contracts are selected or how much the 
contracts are worth. This is largely due to the unaccountability of the NNPC, which is still 
subject to the political elite s control of the state. What happens to the oil and gas 
revenues remains largely unknown to the public. In this regard, CSOs play a critical role in 
pushing both the government and oil and gas investors to play with open cards.   
Medium risk 
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4.2.4 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Judicial 
Structures 
In Nigeria, the regular court system consists of federal and state trial courts, state appeal 
courts, the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court (Amundsen, 2010: 19). The 
judiciary is formally independent and its legal status, including financial autonomy, is 
guaranteed by the constitution. Although the constitution and laws of Nigeria provide for an 
independent judiciary, the judicial branch is susceptible to some executive pressure, 
particularly at the state and local levels. However, the judiciary is increasingly acting as a 
check against arbitrary acts at the political level. The courts have managed well to self-
improve despite a challenging political environment. There is also a general impression 
that the judicial branch is the most promising branch in the political system, in terms of 
independence, authority and action. Empowered by the constitution, the judiciary has ruled 
against the government in some landmark cases, and judges have proved to adjudicate in 
citizens disputes with government (Amundsen, 2010: x).   
Still, however, court officials often lack the proper equipment, training, and 
motivation to perform their duties, with lack of motivation primarily due to inadequate 
compensation (US Department of State, 2010). Understaffing, under-functioning, 
inefficiency and corruption also prevent the judiciary from functioning satisfactorily. 
Moreover, Nigerian regulations are often contradictory, which makes it unclear and difficult 
to identify which rules apply in particular cases (Control Risks, 2009b: 12). There have 
also been several cases where judges fail to appear for trials, often because they can 
pursue other sources of income and sometimes because of threats against them 
(Amundsen, 2010: 19). Furthermore, Nigerian legal services are expensive, and judicial 
processes very slow (Amundsen, 2010: 19).   
The Nigerian government has taken important steps towards institutional reform, 
notably by setting up the already mentioned agencies of ICPC in 2000 and the EFCC in 
2004. Further significant developments include the decision to prosecute Nigerian officials 
implicated in the international investigations of Willbros and Siemens. There have also 
been a number of domestic corruption investigations involving many former governors as 
well as prominent businessmen often the same people (Control Risks, 2009b: 3). The 
enabling laws of the agencies give them wide powers, but it must be noted that there are a 
number of grey areas in their powers and mandates (Global Integrity, 2008: 116). If 
complaining to supervisory bodies fails, there is still the possibility of taking the case to 
court. Most oil and gas companies, however, try to avoid such scenarios at all costs 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
69
because of the length and cost of court procedures and the inefficiency of the courts. Legal 
recourse is possible and is in fact a key element of any committed anti-corruption strategy, 
but it is costly both in time and lawyers fees, and is generally only last resort (Control 
Risks, 2009b: 28).   
The Public Procurement Act (PPA) requires that major procurements, such as oil 
and gas exploration licences, shall be conducted by open competitive bidding, but it is 
subject to some exemptions and licence contracts are not embedded in a regulatory law. 
An unsatisfied bidder can appeal for an administrative review or challenge procurement 
decisions in court. However, in practice this is very costly and time consuming (Global 
Integrity, 2008: 84).   
The key enforcement agency, the Nigerian police, is generally independent in its 
operation, but there have been allegations about their process and that officers are being 
used to achieve political aims (Global Integrity, 2008: 125). Despite patchy enforcement, 
the prominence of continuing investigations within Nigeria has certainly led to altered 
behaviour, with a diminished sense that certain individuals are untouchable or above the 
law (Control Risks, 2009b: 4).     
There have been numerous calls for a more independent judiciary over the last 
years, both from outside of the judiciary itself, and from inside (US Department of State, 
2010). The broad alliance made up of the government, the two corruption commissions, 
NGOs and international actors, the IMF, World Bank, Transparency International, and the 
International Finance Task Force, has made at least some progress in Nigerian society, 
amongst others calling for improved judicial structures, which benefits the oil and gas 
investors. A further strengthened judicial system makes it more effective to enforce 
contracts between the NNPC and the oil and gas investor.   
Compared to the matrix, the current situation of the judicial system in Nigeria ranks 
as a medium risk for the oil and gas investor. Although the Nigerian constitution and laws 
of Nigeria provide for an independent judiciary, the judicial branch is susceptible to some 
executive pressure. There are, furthermore, some deficiencies in the framework conditions 
in the oil and gas industry and in licence contracts. The PPA requires that oil and gas 
exploration licences shall be conducted by open competitive bidding, but it is subject to 
some exemptions. This applies to a sometimes arbitrary legal machinery for the 
application of regulations and laws. The judiciary is, however, increasingly acting as a 
check against these arbitrary acts at the political level. The judiciary is possibly the most 
difficult of the branches to influence in the political framework of Nigeria, yet there have 
been numerous calls for a more independent judiciary. For the oil and gas investor, the 
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important thing is that there is the possibility to appeal for administrative reviews or even 
challenge procurement decisions in court. However, in practice, the investor must be 
prepared for a costly and time-consuming procedure.   
Medium risk 
4.2.5 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Capture 
Economy  
The share of the value of the petroleum production collected as revenue by the host 
government is often referred to as the government take. Nigerias system of calculating 
taxes, royalties and tax rebates is mainly structured around Joint Venture (JV) agreements 
and Production Sharing Agreements (PSCs) between the government and the oil and gas 
companies (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 9). In a PSC, the operator incurs all risk 
as it puts up the funds for exploration and production activities. If and when production 
begins, the oil is divided into cost oil and profit oil . Cost oil goes to the operator so it can 
recoup its investments. Profit oil and gas is split between the operator and NNPC at a 
proportion set in the contract (Gillies, 2009: 2). In this regard, the overall conditions in the 
Nigerian system are known to be on the tough side for the oil and gas companies (Amadi, 
Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 9). The government take will differ between different fields 
according to their projected profitability. A high-risk expensive development will typically 
have a lower government take, while a low-risk, less expensive development will have a 
higher government take specified in the contract between government and the oil company 
(Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 9). The Nigerian system is (like in many other 
petroleum producing countries) arranged such that the oil companies get some extra profit 
if the oil price goes up, but the government receives the bulk of it (Amadi, Germiso and 
Henriksen, 2006: 9).  
In addition, the Nigerian government uses the common method of claiming 
signature bonuses to acquire benefits from its petroleum resources, which is a payment 
that is made upfront to the host country for the right to develop a block commercially 
before work begins. This system is a widely recognized and a legally accepted way for an 
oil company to secure the right to explore a certain field or block. These fees are kept by 
the host government regardless of whether oil is found or not, or whether commercial 
production takes place (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 56). The International Oil 
and Gas Companies that have operated in Nigeria have been satisfied with the signature 
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that grants them permission, and merely transferred the agreed amount to the account 
number they are told to. However, according to Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen (2006: 56), 
there is good reason to believe that many politicians and bureaucrats in Nigeria have 
made their way to personal wealth through stealing from the bonuses. In this regard, it is 
extremely important that oil and gas companies publish what they pay in signature 
bonuses, so that civil society and the relevant government agencies can track this money, 
and oil and gas companies can claim that they are clean.  
The Nigerian government retains a high degree of control over transactions, such 
as large-scale contracts, primarily to oil and gas service companies. In principle, it is the 
operator company that awards these contracts; however, in Nigeria NNPC approves all 
contracts or expenses over US$ 1 million. For PSCs, NAPIMS approves anything over 
US$ 250 000. These thresholds are considered extremely low by industry standards and 
inflate government involvement in contract decision making, which also gives good 
opportunity for government officials to demand bribes from the oil and gas investor (Gillies, 
2009). Some prosecutions under the US FCPA have revealed how corruption has 
infiltrated in contracting procedures, such as in 2008, a former CEO from a US oil service 
company pled guilty to paying around US$ 180 million in bribes to the NNPC, the 
Petroleum Ministry and other government officials. In addition to receiving bribes, 
government officials can benefit from procedures that favour companies in which they 
have a financial stake. For instance, senior political leaders reportedly manipulated 
tenders to benefit Intels Nigeira Ltd, a large logistics company, for their private gain 
(Gillies, 2009:3). Alternatively, officials can give preference to companies owned by their 
allies, and then seek repayment through other business deals or political favours (Gillies, 
2009: 3).  
Another flaw in the capture economy of Nigeria is oil bunkering, which is the theft of 
crude oil directly from pipelines, flow stations and export facilities. The estimates of the 
amount of bunkering are huge. Most sources quote around 100 000 barrels per day lost 
via bunkering in Nigeria. Some estimates, however, run as high as 600 000 barrels per 
day (Gillies, 2009: 3). It is widely alleged that both government and oil company 
representatives are involved in bunkering activities. Groups of well-armed men typically 
execute the pipeline sabotage, but their activities are overseen by powerful figures (Gillies, 
2009: 3). Other methods of bunkering (for instance, loading of more crude than is reported 
onto export vessels) would likely require some level of official involvement. Bunkering 
metes out serious costs as it lowers the amount of crude Nigerian exports, thereby 
reducing the revenues which accrue to the state. The security risks and damage to 
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equipment associated with bunkering dissuade investment into onshore exploration and 
production. Another negative aspect about the bunkering is that it provides a steady 
stream of funding for the militant movements and corrupt associations responsible for 
destabilising the Delta region. Buying arms, paying militant forces and bribing officials 
become easier with readily available cash at hand (Gillies, 2009: 3). The capture economy 
in Nigeria thus harms the national interest by increasing the amount of wealth available 
through illicit means (Gillies, 2009: 4).     
The Nigerian oil and gas sector is characterized by a high presence of a capture 
economy and thereby rates as a high risk for the oil and gas investor, according to the 
matrix. Nigeria can in its wide term be referred to as a capture economy. There is good 
reason to believe that many Nigerian politicians and bureaucrats have made their way to 
personal wealth through stealing from the signature bonuses. Furthermore, the Nigerian 
government retains a high control over all transactions, including oil and gas service 
companies. Several prosecutions under the US FCPA have revealed how corruption has 
infiltrated in these contracting procedures. Coupled with widespread illegal oil bunkering, 
escalating attacks against foreign-owned installations, support vessels and personnel in 
Nigeria is exacting a heavy toll on the oil and gas industry in the country.  
High risk 
4.2.6 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Inequality and 
Development  
The macro-economic fundamentals for growth in Nigeria are better today than they have 
ever been in the past 20 years. Economic growth has averaged about six percent per 
annum over the last years, budget balances are under control, inflation has declined to 
single digits, and exchange rate stability has been achieved (Amundsen, 2010: ix). 
However, Nigeria still faces significant challenges in altering the oil and gas sector into a 
substantial value adding activity for the Nigerian economy, not to say for the Nigerian 
society as a whole (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 8). Petroleum revenue has 
become paramount in the Nigerian society and the government has been so focused on oil 
and gas that it seems to have paid too little attention to the other economic sectors of the 
country (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 10). The extremely uneven income 
distribution in Nigeria adds to the problem, with a few people becoming very rich whilst the 
majority live in poverty (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 10). The NNPC, which 
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earns revenues through a number of its subsidiaries, is subject to unusually limited 
budgetary and expenditure oversight. Beyond these specific challenges, the utility of oil 
and revenues depends on the wider practices of budgetary planning, execution, and 
oversight at the federal, state, and local levels of government (Gillies, 2009: 4). Typically, 
an oil or gas contract includes a prerequisite that preference shall be given to contractors 
whose companies are registered under the laws of the host state, and also to goods 
manufactured or produced in the host state. Experience however shows that Nigeria has 
hardly been able to identify qualified local suppliers, and has often chosen to employ 
internationally recognised contractors. In an attempt to change this, the Nigerian 
authorities employed a new approach to local content in the 2005 bid round and made 
local content a biddable item in the round (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 57).  
The Nigerian government has been infamous for a lack of correspondence between 
the revenue benefits accruing from the oil and gas sector and the overall performance of 
the Nigerian economy (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 9). This is largely due to 
corruption and a clear economic strategy over the years and decades of fiscal indiscipline 
from previous governments; yet some initiatives have been put in place, such as the 
National economic and development agenda, called the New Economic Empowerment 
And Development Strategy (NEEDS) (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 9). The 
NEEDS seeks to implement a series of reforms that can lay a diversified economy in the 
years to come. The major growth indices within NEEDS are wealth creation, employment 
generation, institutional reforms and social charter. However, in a country where good 
policy content has often been overcome by weak implementing institutions, corruption and 
lack of political will, there is a lot of scepticism as to whether the goals and priorities 
articulated within NEEDS will actually bear fruit (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 
11). Moreover, there are a few other initiatives with development in mind, such as 
government and companies allocation of some oil earnings to the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) and the Petroleum Technology Development Fund 
(PTDF).However, serious accusations of fraud have also surrounded both institutions in 
recent years (Gillies, 2009: 4).   
The perception of large levels of civil society is that both the government and the oil 
companies are regarded as collaborators or co-conspirators, who have teamed up to 
aggravate poverty and exploit Nigerians of their rights in terms of dignity and access to the 
oil and gas revenues (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 41). As far as they are 
concerned about the oil and gas sector operations in Nigeria, increased oil revenue does 
not necessarily indicate increased development or better standards of living for ordinary 
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people. Clarification as to what exactly happens to oil revenues remains unclear, even as 
the legal/policy framework for oil and gas operations remain even poorly articulated and 
updated about what currently exists for oil and gas production (Amadi, Germiso and 
Henriksen, 2006: 42).   
The huge developmental gaps in the country have led to the placing of 
developmental demands at the doorsteps of the oil companies, and an expectation 
sometimes that they play surrogate government in a society where national and state 
leadership all too often have failed to deliver the dividends of development (Amadi, 
Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 42). The oil and gas companies that are currently or have 
operated earlier in Nigeria, have often referred to the dilemma that citizens in the host 
communities expect them to play the role of alternative government , especially when it 
comes to the provision of basic amenities. Community demands range from the 
construction of roads, schools and provision of safe drinking water, to the provision of 
scholarship and employment opportunities. As far as the oil companies are concerned, 
what this shows is a lack of understanding as to the delineation between corporate and 
state/local/federal government responsibility towards the communities, and also how the 
demands should be placed (Amadi, Germiso and Henriksen, 2006: 42).  
The macro-economic fundamentals and economic growth have improved in Nigeria 
over the past years, yet little is reflected in Nigerian society as a whole, and according to 
the matrix, the level of corruption risk for the oil and gas investor is high. The Nigerian 
economy is very dependent on the petroleum revenues and little effort has been made to 
generate competence and local capital in order to diversify the economy and create jobs. 
Highly uneven income distribution and extreme rates of inequality still persist in the 
society. Attempts of certain institutions to deal with this problem have been set up. 
However, there is no substantial implementation and a general lack of political influence, 
coupled with serious accusations of fraud surrounding the Nigerian institutions. Adding to 
the problem is the lack of clarification as to what exactly happens to oil revenues and this 
generates popular discontent amongst civil society, which doesn t delineate between the 
oil and gas companies and the government. The management and allocation of oil 
revenues require much greater oversight than is presently the case.  
High risk 
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4.2.7 Indicator of Level of Corruption in Oil and Gas Industry: Perceptions of 
Corruption and Anti-Corruption Measures 
The CPI ranking is based on data from country experts and business leaders at ten 
independent institutions, including the World Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit and World 
Economic Forum. In 2010, Nigeria was ranked 134 out of 178 countries. The score was 
2.4. CPI country scores are on a scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (very corrupt) (TI, 2010). 
The TI Global Corruption Barometer 2010 offers an insight into Nigerians perception of 
their own institutions. The survey showed that citizens took particularly poor view of the 
political parties, which was given a rating of 4.5 on a scale of one to five where five 
represents the highest level of corruption. Other institutions that performed poorly include 
parliament, rated 4,2; police, rated 4,7; public officials, rated 3,5; and the judiciary, rated 
3,7 (GCB, 2010). Adding to this poor evaluation, Nigerian respondents took a relatively 
divided view of the future outlook: 46 percent thought that their government s effort to fight 
corruption is effective, and 73 percent rather see that corruption levels have increased in 
the past three years, compared with ten percent who thinks they have stayed the same, 
and 17 percent who thinks the levels of corruption have decreased in the country (GCB, 
2010). According to the Global Integrity Report 20088, Nigeria was rated as weak overall, 
64 out of 100, 100 being the best score.  The legal framework was found to be somewhat 
stronger (79 of 100); however, the actual implementation is reported to be very weak (48 
of 100). The report found that Nigeria continues to suffer from poor accountability across 
all branches of government and the civil service, while citizens right to access information 
is embedded in the regulation of some specific agencies. Furthermore, a general freedom 
of information act has been sitting in the Nigerian legislature since 1999. The PPA of 2007 
is still in the implementation process, but it is viewed as having a positive effect on 
Nigerian procurement practices (Global Integrity: Nigeria, 2008).   
As the measures of the three indexes correlate among themselves and all score the 
level of perceived corruption as high, this indicator is indisputably also ranked as high.   
Overall risk rating: High risk 
4.2.8 Overall Risk Rating of Nigeria 
Each of the seven indicators have been applied to the oil and gas sector in Nigeria, and 
measured according to the matrix. Viewing the final measurements of all the indicators, 
                                                 
8 The 2008 report is the most recent version that could be obtained from the Internet.  
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two of them are rated medium, while five are rated as high risk. Thereby, the overall risk 
rating of corruption in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria is high. The explanation of the 
high-risk level can be summarised as follows; the history of corruption in Nigeria is strongly 
rooted. Successive military regimes have subjugated the rule of law, followed by failed 
attempts at democracy, where the government instead has facilitated the wanton looting of 
public funds and decapitated many of the public institutions.  
4.3 Conclusion  
This chapter has applied the matrix from Chapter Three to the oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria. This has been done in an attempt to establish how and to what level corruption 
constitutes a political risk factor for the oil and gas investor. The result of the indicators, not 
surprisingly, demonstrates that corruption remains rife in many facets of Nigerias public 
and private sectors, which spills out to a high extent in the oil and gas industry. The 
political risk of encountering corruption for the oil and gas investor is thus high in Nigeria.   
Although there is a constitutional separation of powers in Nigeria, there is a 
separation of functions, yet not a clear separation of functionaries. The NNPC is highly 
exposed to corruption, and the DPR suffers from low capacity and unclear regulatory 
function. The oil resources have given the ruling elite both the incentives for controlling the 
state apparatus and the means to retain control of the state, and the phenomenon of rent-
seeking and elite capture are highly applicable to the Nigerian economy. The Nigerian 
political structure is one of several monopolies in key segments of the economy, of which 
many are relevant to the oil and gas sector. The existing legal framework grants 
discretionary authority to top officials and does not clearly delineate roles and 
responsibilities among the sector s actors. The use of intermediaries or middle-men is a 
frequent phenomenon in Nigeria. Bribery, favouritism, and contract non-performance 
frequently mar these license and contract transactions in Nigeria. Although there are a 
number of established institutions of specialise control, geared to the petroleum economy 
and petroleum-related problems, again, all are more or less subject to the political elite s 
control of the state. The Nigerian constitution and laws of Nigeria provide for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judicial branch is susceptible to executive pressure, 
particularly at the state and local levels. But it remains to be said that the judiciary is 
increasingly acting as a check against arbitrary acts at the political level. Both the CPI 
ranking, the GCB and the Global Integrity report rate the level of corruption in Nigeria as 
high. The political risk facing the oil and gas investor is high, as the sum of indicators point 
in that direction. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion  
5.1 Introduction  
The research study commenced by focusing on the oil and gas investors continuous 
search for opportunities in regions and areas where oil and gas have been identified. As 
stated at the outset of this research endeavour, oil and gas investors are exposed to a 
number of risks of various kinds that can affect such a  company s reputation, expected 
returns or loss of investment entirely. Political risk analysis assists in the investment 
process to locate the areas of risk and contribute to the overall decision-making process 
that all oil and gas companies carry out in their investments.   
Many of the political risks faced by the oil and gas sector originate from the political, 
structural and institutional framework of the host country. The interaction with government 
officials and the conduct and arrangements are often different in foreign countries, and the 
practices may be very divergent to their familiar business etiquette at home. Corruption is 
one such phenomenon that can manifest itself in an investment country and potentially 
constitute a political risk for the oil and gas investor. Many oil and gas ventures have (or 
are currently) operating in countries where various forms of corruption are inherent in the 
state s modus operandi, making the oil and gas companies particularly exposed to the risk 
of encountering corruption.  
Although corruption is a complex phenomenon to define in rigid terms, there is an 
overall understanding that it hampers profit for the oil and gas investors. Furthermore, 
involvement in corrupt activities can have drastic consequences for the oil and gas 
investors in terms of costly fines, penalties, reputational damage or indirect structural 
quandaries. The goal of this research has been to provide an extensive investigation on 
how corruption constitutes a political risk factor in the oil and gas industry and determine 
how it can be measured as part of a political risk analysis for the oil and gas investor. The 
intention of this research was thereby to provide a practical solution to the research 
problem with the supplement and support of two sub-questions, which will further be 
explained in the third section.   
Having an understanding of the environment and the level of corruption in an 
investment country enables the investor to make sophisticated, informed and rational 
decisions about the political risk associated with the investment. Corruption manifests itself 
in many forms of varying degrees of severity, which creates a blurred distinction of what is 
tolerable and what is not. However, with an accurate understanding of where and how 
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corruption as a risk arises in the oil and gas industry, management can drive higher-quality 
returns to the bottom line. This thesis has argued that it is of crucial importance and 
interest for oil and gas companies to have a stipulated concept of corruption as a political 
risk factor in their industry.  
5.2 Course of the Research Study 
Chapter One introduced the research study with a general introduction, followed by a brief 
literature review. The research question was presented together with two sub-questions 
that were identified as crucial to conduct the research study. The rationale of the research 
discussed the relevance and validation of the study and the research objective was 
presented to clarify the function of a measurement tool of corruption as a political risk 
factor. The research design and methodology was outlined, followed by the limitations and 
delimitations of the study. Finally, a simplified readers guide of the remaining course of the 
study was presented.   
Chapter Two had a dual aim, where it firstly focused upon the theoretical framework 
for the discipline of political risk analysis central to this research. In this regard, 
conceptualizations of key political risk terms were systematically presented. Secondly, 
Chapter Two aimed at explaining the large composition of the oil and gas sector as well as 
a contextualization of political risk in the oil and gas industry. The purpose of this chapter, 
in examining the theoretical foundation and contextualizing political risk in the oil and gas 
industry, was to provide a clearly defined point of departure of conceptualizing corruption 
in Chapter Three and measuring corruption as a political risk factor for oil and gas 
investors in Nigeria in Chapter Four.   
Chapter Three presented a broad overview of the phenomenon of corruption and 
discussed some of the consequences for investors involvement in corrupt activity. As 
such, corruption stipulates as a political risk factor and Chapter Three aimed to arrive at a 
conceptualisation of corruption that is most suitable and directed towards the oil and gas 
industry. Seven generic indicators of corruption were introduced and moulded into 
industry-specific indicators that are applicable to measure the level of corruption in the oil 
and gas sector of an investment country. These indicators were subsequently ranked into 
a matrix that was constructed with the aim to use it as a general measurement tool for oil 
and gas investors.   
Chapter Four applied the matrix from Chapter Three to the oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria. This was carried out in an attempt to establish how and to what level corruption 
constitutes a political risk factor for the oil and gas industry. The result of the indicators, not 
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surprisingly, demonstrated that corruption remains rife in many facets of Nigerias public 
and private sectors, which spills out to a high extent in the oil and gas industry. The 
political risk of encountering corruption for the oil and gas investor was thus demonstrated 
to be of a high level in Nigeria.  
5.3 Evaluation of the Research Study 
Oil and gas companies usually conduct a political risk analysis as an integral part of their 
international investment analysis and strategy plan. As the research has pointed out, the 
political situation in many of the resource-abundant countries can pose considerable risks 
for the oil and gas operations and towards the expected profits and returns. It is therefore 
argued in this research that it is of high value to conduct a systematic and industry-specific 
analysis that can assist in the decision making process.   
Corruption is a phenomenon that has been identified as rampant in the business 
world and gained considerable attention in modern times. In this study, it was pointed out 
that there is no universal agreed upon definition of corruption and hence a need for 
research in understanding how it constitutes as a political risk for oil and gas companies. 
Despite there being no universal definition of corruption, being involved or associated with 
corruption can have dramatic consequences for an oil and gas company, both in terms of 
financial loss and with regards to the reputation of the company. In this study, a number of 
examples from the past decade have demonstrated how several companies involvement 
in corrupt activity have been charged with large-scale bribery, which in turn has resulted in 
major fines, bankruptcy or individuals being imprisoned. All the major industrialised 
countries now have laws against foreign bribery, and according to Control Risks (2009a: 
1), we can expect a continuing trend towards tighter enforcement in these countries. As 
such, corruption manifests as a political risk factor to the oil and gas investor and the 
purpose of this research study was to examine how corruption manifests as a political risk 
factor to the oil and gas investor and finding appropriate means to measure the level of 
corruption as a risk for the oil and gas investor.   
The main research question was formulated as follows: How should corruption as a 
political risk factor be measured in order to provide an accurate assessment of the risk 
factor within the oil and gas industry? Concurrently, two sub-questions were identified to 
supplement and support the main research question in the conduct of the research. The 
first sub-question was to find an adequate conceptualisation of corruption as a political risk 
factor within the oil and gas industry; and secondly, determine what indicators can be used 
to measure corruption as a political risk factor in the oil and gas industry.  
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The research found that corruption can best be explained by relating it to rational-
choice theory and economic incentive theory. With this as a derivation, the study leans on 
the hypothesis by Al-Kasim, Søreide and Williams (2008: 31) that an agent chooses 
corruption over honest conduct, where, in such calculation, the benefits outweigh the risks. 
Based upon a range of widely used definitions of corruption, the study found that they all 
assign equal importance to offering , receiving and soliciting of gifts or bribes. 
Additionally, in explaining corruption, the actors involved in corrupt practices were 
analysed from the supply-side and demand-side of corruption. It was discovered that 
corrupt engagement must ultimately be analysed from the perspective of the parties 
involved. This was demonstrated in a figurative triumvirate, where the actors involved can 
be divided into the Principal , the Agent and Client . Moreover, corruption must also be 
regarded within a specific institutional framework as a condition for the fulfilment of a 
corrupt transaction.   
In the context of corruption occurring in the oil and gas sector, the three main actors 
involved, the Principal, the Agent and the Client, were translated respectively into: the 
entity or authority that grants and approves oil and gas projects; the civil servant 
representing the authorities; and thirdly, the oil and gas investment company. On the basis 
of the Principal-Agent-Client theory, the research found an appropriate conceptualisation 
of corruption as a political risk factor in the oil and gas industry, which could further assist 
answering the second sub-question.   
The second sub-question was to determine the adequate indicators of corruption as 
a political risk factor in the oil and gas industry. This was approached by firstly identifying 
generic indicators that are applicable to all business investments and operations in a 
foreign country. The literature and data sources used in the third chapter introduced a 
number of general causes and explanations to the occurrence of corruption. These were 
trimmed down to what was considered the most salient and relevant variables for this 
study. Seven indicators were then identified that are within a national political and 
institutional framework of an investment country. The research ascertained that these 
structures were instrumental in defining opportunities for corruption at an institutional level. 
Based upon comprehensive literature, it was argued that it is at the institutional level that 
oil and gas investors are likely to encounter corruption that is relevant to their risk 
assessment.  
The generic indicators served as a first-tier operationalisation of the study. The 
second-tier operationalisation of the research was to fashion the generic indicators into 
specific indicators of corruption in the oil and gas industry. This was carried out by whittling 
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down the generic framework of corruption to the oil and gas industrys general activities in 
an investment country, and the political structural and institutional framework that is mostly 
relevant to the oil and gas investor.  The indicators proved both useful and functional for 
the desired outcome, which was to create an explanatory, practical and effective method 
of assessing the level of corruption as a political risk for the oil and gas industry.   
The seven assorted indicators were systematically placed into a matrix to make it 
operative in measuring the level of risk; high, medium or low. This matrix was developed 
based on underlying theory of political risk central to this study and established in Chapter 
Two, and further based on the foundation presented in Chapter Three, which focused on 
the generic and industry specific indicators.   
The main research question was largely treated and answered by the two sub-
questions. The real litmus test of the measurement tool and the selected indicators was to 
apply it to a case study. Nigeria was chosen for this research for two rather obvious 
reasons: firstly, because of the country s abundance of oil and gas resources, and 
secondly, due to the strongly rooted history of corruption. Each indicator was applied to the 
current situation in Nigeria, which measured the level of corruption present in the various 
political institutional structures and regulatory framework of the oil and gas sector in the 
country. The result of the indicators, not surprisingly, demonstrated that corruption remains 
rife in many facets of Nigeria s oil and gas industry. According to the measurement tool, 
the political risk of encountering corruption for the oil and gas investor is thus high in 
Nigeria.  
Political risk analysis can observe and measure such threats as corruption, which 
contributes to businesses recognition and anticipation of such future occurrence. This 
study only treated one of many risk factors that need to be included in a complete political 
risk analysis. However, as corruption is one of the factors that need more exhaustive 
scrutiny, this study can hopefully provide a valuable contribution to this specific area. This 
study has firstly been successful in providing an overview of the complexities and many 
facets involved in corruption as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the study has outlined the 
major consequences for investors to be involved in corruption and how it, as such, 
constitutes as a political risk factor for investors. The study was specified to the oil and gas 
industry for two main reasons. Firstly, because political risk analysis, when conducted, is 
usually directed towards one type of industry or one specific investment case. Secondly, 
as the study has demonstrated, conceptualizing corruption as a risk factor should be linked 
to a specific context. Although there is no universal definition of corruption in general 
terms, this study has provided a useful conceptualisation of corruption specifically for the 
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context of the oil and gas sector. In addition, the study has provided a practical 
measurement tool, with the intention that it can be applied to any investment country and 
as a valuable supplement to the overall political risk analysis. The applicability of the 
matrix, as demonstrated by the case study of Nigeria, proved to have a functional utility, 
and as such, provide a solid result from measuring the indicators. The overall result of this 
study has reached its main goal and provided an answer to the research question.  
5.4 Critique of the Research and Suggestions for Further Research 
A high political risk factor in itself does not mean that investors should stay away from a 
country or a region. A high degree of risk, if sufficiently managed, can instead result in 
increased opportunities for higher returns or competitive advantage in comparison to other 
oil and gas investors (Alon et al., 2006: 624). The investor can take the assessment results 
and consider the further viability of the investment. This is done in light of the strategies 
that will have to be implemented in order to manage these risks and thus ensure that the 
profitability of the investment can be secured (Brink, 2004: 149). Risk management is an 
important element that has not been addressed in this study, due to limited space and 
resources. Political risk management is the strategy that the investment company employs 
according to the investment climate and as such contributes to the investors decision-
making. Risk management was not taken into account, as it in itself requires major 
attention, and should be dedicated to another research.   
Embarking upon a conceptualization of corruption as a political risk for the oil and 
gas sector required finding the relevant variables and framework for the oil and gas 
industry. In doing this, the study narrowed the framework down to only regard the political 
institutional framework. Although this proved to be a practical solution to exclude a range 
of irrelevant variables, it might at the same time have excluded other important and useful 
variables potentially relevant to a more comprehensive assessment of corruption as a risk 
in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, there is certainly a need to enhance the 
conceptualisation of corruption as a political risk factor. Future research is recommended 
to expand upon the framework of corruption as a risk for the oil and gas investor, and 
possibly include cultural, social and individual variables.   
The generic indicators derived from the conceptualisation of corruption as a political 
risk for the oil and gas investor.  The secondary literature that was used contributed a 
great extent in determining the indicators and measuring their level of risk. However, 
further study could benefit largely from primary data from both the political risk industry 
itself and the oil and gas industry. This would enhance the knowledge regarding the real 
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world development and application of political risk factors. Such first-hand information 
could be obtained by conducting interviews with relevant actors from both industries and 
by doing longer-term field research. Furthermore, access to existing measurement tools of 
corruption that oil and gas companies operate with today, could furthermore allow for 
valuable insight and comparison of the indicators.   
In addition to the abovementioned areas for potential expansions, is the need for 
supplementary case studies. Although the matrix was useful in testing it on the oil and gas 
industry in Nigeria, a more refined matrix would require other case studies to compare and 
adjust the measurement tool. Moreover, the information that was used to analyse the 
indicators in the case of Nigeria were all retrieved from secondary sources.  
5.6 Conclusion 
This study has firstly been an examination of corruption as a political risk factor for the oil 
and gas investor. Secondly, the study has provided a practical measurement tool that can 
assess the level of risk, which has been tested using the case study of the Nigerian oil and 
gas sector. Corruption has increasingly been acknowledged as hazardous for an oil and 
gas company s profits and as a considerable risk that needs further exploration in the field 
of political risk assessment.   
Conceptualising corruption as a political risk factor proved to be a significant 
challenge, as it manifests itself in many forms and varying degrees of severity. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of consistency amongst the existing definitions of corruption 
and a disparate understanding of the threshold of acceptance for corrupt behaviour. 
However, this study provided a crucial contribution in the greater discussion by isolating 
corruption in the oil and gas industry and finding appropriate indicators to measure the 
phenomenon as a political risk for oil and gas investors.   
From a broader perspective, the study contributes to the field of political risk analysis 
by highlighting the need for an industry-specific conceptualisation and measurement of 
corruption as a political risk factor. As such, political risk analysis has the potential to 
further develop and give more accurate assessments. By analysing the existing risks from 
both the supply-side and demand-side of corruption, management strategies can be 
fashioned to mitigate the risk.  
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